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Abstract
Notwithstanding the considerable attention private equity
receives, there continues to be substantial confusion about what
private equity does and whether this creates value. Calls for more
aggressive regulation of the industry reflect a skeptical view of
private equity as—at best—a zero-sum game, in which profits are
generated only at the expense of other constituencies. The standard
defense of private equity points to its corporate governance
advantages as a source of value. This Article identifies an
overlooked and increasingly important way in which private equity
creates value: private equity firms act as gatekeepers in the debt
markets. As repeat players, private equity firms use their reputations
with creditors to mitigate the problems of borrower adverse selection
and moral hazard in the companies that they manage, thereby
reducing creditors’ costs of lending to these companies. Private
equity-owned companies are thus able to borrow money on more
favorable terms than standalone companies, all else being equal. By
acting as gatekeepers, private equity firms render the debt markets
more efficient and provide their portfolio companies with an
increasingly valuable borrowing advantage. Ironically, then, debt
may well be private equity’s greatest asset.
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Introduction
Private equity—the business of buying and selling
companies—is seemingly ubiquitous. Whether prompted by the
fallout from the financial crisis or Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential
campaign, private equity has caught the public’s attention, resulting
in a barrage of conflicting claims as to private equity’s social worth,
or lack thereof.1
Public interest in private equity is unsurprising. Since its
beginnings in the 1980s, private equity activity has grown
dramatically, albeit in a highly cyclical fashion.2 Its most recent peak
of activity coincided with the unprecedented merger wave of 2004 to
2007 and came to an abrupt halt when the subprime-mortgage
collapse caused the debt markets to seize up.3 The frenetic pace of
activity during that period generated untold wealth for the largest
private equity firms (KKR, Carlyle, Apollo, and the like), which in
turn led to widespread calls to regulate and tax the industry more
aggressively, both in the U.S. and abroad.4

1

For an overview of the different views on private equity, see Julie
Creswell, Profits for Buyout Firms as Company Debt Soared, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2009, at A1; Steven M. Davidoff, With Private Equity Under Attack,
Academia Tries to Quantify Its Value, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, at B4;
James Surowiecki, Private Inequity, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at
21; Jia Lynn Yang, Romney’s Bain Capital Tenure Shows Mixed
Bankruptcy Record, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2011, at A8; The Bain Capital
Bonfire, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970204879004577108500491449164.html.
2
At its most recent peak of activity in 2006, private equity represented over
20% of all mergers and acquisitions in the United States. Marc Martos-Vila,
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & Jarrad Harford, Financial vs. Strategic Buyers 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19378, 2013),
available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/events/capitalMarket/pdf/CMW55
Vila_M.pdf.
3
See generally Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 481 (Mar. 2009); EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT,
CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, A PRIMER ON PRIVATE EQUITY AT
WORK 11 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/private-equity-2012-02.pdf (explaining that “[d]eal activity
slowed substantially beginning in the second half of 2007, and by 2009 was
below its level [in] 2003”).
4
Raising Taxes on Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, at A18.
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Negative public sentiment towards private equity stems from
the sense that its success comes solely at others’ expense.5 On this
view, private equity is a particularly ingenious type of wealth
transfer, in which private equity firms “privatize[] the gains and
socialize[] the losses.”6 If the characterization of private equity as a
mere shell game is warranted, the demands to curtail it should be
heeded. But if instead private equity creates social value, the
regulatory calculus is considerably more complex.
The defense of private equity hews to a now-familiar story.7
Private equity creates value, the argument goes, by providing better
corporate governance, particularly as compared to public-company
governance.8 With public companies, ownership (by dispersed
shareholders) is divided from control (by management), giving rise
to the familiar agency costs of management: managers have
incentives to shirk, to use company assets for private benefits, and so
forth, while public shareholders face a collective action problem
preventing them from adequately supervising and incentivizing
management.9 With private equity, however, ownership and control
are reunited in the companies that private equity firms acquire (their
“portfolio companies”).10 As the sole or controlling shareholder,11
5

In this depiction of private equity, the losers have at various points been
identified as taxpayers, workers, creditors, selling shareholders of target
companies, and even the investors in private equity funds. See discussion
infra Part I.B.1.
6
Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, Romney’s Bain Yielded Private Gains,
Socialized Losses, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 15, 2012, 6:30 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-15/romney-s-bain-yieldedprivate-gains-socialized-losses.html.
7
See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
8
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private
Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 121–22 (2009).
9
Scott J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules for Director Selection and
Liability Help Public Companies Gain Some of Private Equity’s
Advantages?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 85 (2009). For the original description
of this feature of modern corporations, see ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
277–79 (1933).
10
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 123.
11
As discussed infra in Part I, private equity portfolio companies are
actually owned by the private equity fund (rather than the private equity
firm). FRANCESCO BALDI, PRIVATE EQUITY TARGETS: STRATEGIES FOR
GROWTH, MARKET BARRIERS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 9 (2013). Because
a private equity fund delegates all managerial authority for its portfolio
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private equity firms have both the ability and the incentives to ensure
that their portfolio companies’ management acts in the private equity
firms’ best interests. On this theory, then, private equity firms create
value by reducing the agency costs of management. Our
understanding of private equity has stalled in this debate over wealth
transfers versus corporate governance benefits for quite some time.
This Article tells a different story about private equity:
private equity firms create value by acting as gatekeepers in the debt
markets.12 They do so by reducing the agency costs of debt in their
portfolio companies. As repeat players in the debt markets, private
equity firms establish reputations with creditors that are tied to the
credit performance of their portfolio companies. In turn, they use
their reputations in the debt markets both to certify the
creditworthiness of their portfolio companies ex ante and to bond
against misconduct or poor performance by their portfolio companies
ex post. Private equity firms thereby mitigate the problems of
borrower adverse selection and moral hazard that plague creditors
and increase lending costs above the efficient equilibrium.
The most obvious benefit from this gatekeeping role is that,
all else being equal, it should allow private equity-owned companies
to borrow money on better terms than standalone companies,
whether public or private.13 Thus, private equity-owned companies
have not only a governance advantage, but also a borrowing
advantage over other companies. Private equity firms reduce
companies’ cost of debt capital and creditors’ lending costs,
rendering the debt markets more efficient.
Crucially, private equity’s gatekeeping role should be
increasingly valuable in light of recent sweeping changes in the
corporate loan markets.14 Lenders’ traditional methods of controlling
borrower adverse selection and moral hazard—screening,
companies to the private equity firm, references throughout this Article to a
private equity firm as the “sole” or “controlling” shareholder of a portfolio
company are simply intended as shorthand. The more accurate description
of the private equity ownership structure is used each time it leads to
relevant distinctions, as in Part V.C, infra.
12
See discussion infra Parts II–III, Appendix A.
13
Victoria Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity Advantage:
Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship Banking, 24 REV. FIN. STUD.
2462, 2466 (2011).
14
See discussion infra Part III.A.4 (summarizing current trends in debt
markets).
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monitoring, and covenants—are in sharp decline.15 Less than three
decades ago, relationship banking was the dominant corporate
lending model, giving banks the incentive and ability to monitor their
borrowers closely.16 Today, however, corporate loans are typically
funded by large numbers of both bank and non-bank creditors and
may be traded or securitized to reach still more investors.17 Through
this process, the information and control gap between borrowing
companies and their ultimate creditors has increased significantly,
while creditors’ incentives to monitor their borrowers have
declined.18 Today’s creditors are thus dependent on others to signal
borrowers’ creditworthiness. Private equity firms fulfill precisely this
role. Accordingly, gatekeeping by private equity firms should be an
increasingly valuable—though imperfect—substitute for traditional
bank monitoring. After a post-financial crisis lull, private equity
transactions are again picking up steam.19 It should come as no
surprise that lenders are clamoring to fund them.
The conception of private equity firms as gatekeepers
advances the literature on private equity and the literature on
gatekeeping, both of which are limited by their unerring focus on the
problem of public company governance. As to the first, this Article
reaches the novel conclusion that gatekeeping, not just governance,
accounts for much of private equity’s value. Private equity is less
about optimizing companies’ operations and governance than about
brokering cheap financing. The corporate governance defense of
private equity is thus not only incomplete, but likely overstated. We
15

Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit
Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 643–44 (2009)
(asserting that monitoring and covenants are no longer the most costefficient ways to manage credit risk).
16
Scott Page & Payson Swaffield, An Introduction to the Loan Asset Class,
in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATION AND TRADING 22–23 (Allison
Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007).
17
Whitehead, supra note 15, at 643.
18
Id. at 645.
19
Private equity went quiet for a stretch after its 2004 to 2007 heyday, first
due to lack of capital and then due to overvalued targets and a dismal initial
public offering (“IPO”) market, a key exit for private equity investments.
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 127. There have been signs of an
uptick in private equity activity, however, exemplified by the announcement
of the $24 billion leveraged buyout of Dell led by the private equity group
Silver Lake Partners. Matt Wirz, A Reboot for Buyouts? Depends on Dell
Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at C1.
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should think of private equity firms as lending to companies not only
their operational expertise, but also (and perhaps more importantly)
their financial reputations. As to the second, this Article
demonstrates that there is a broader array of gatekeepers and
gatekeeping strategies than scholars typically suppose. The
foundational example of a gatekeeper is that of an independent
professional organization such as an audit firm that certifies
companies for the benefit of investors. Yet the same frameworks that
have proven useful in identifying when such gatekeepers will be
successful apply equally well to “insider” gatekeepers such as private
equity firms and to their more expansive form of gatekeeping, which
includes not only the traditional certification function, but also
monitoring through direct control and selecting more credit-worthy
companies ex ante.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a
background on the mechanics of private equity acquisitions and
financings, and summarizes the literature on private equity’s social
worth. Part II sets forth the claim that private equity firms act as
gatekeepers in the debt markets, and introduces a simple framework
for identifying financial-market gatekeepers. Applying this
framework to today’s debt markets, Part III demonstrates
conceptually how and why private equity firms act as gatekeepers.
Part IV assesses private equity firms’ performance as gatekeepers by
interpreting available evidence and distinguishing other hypotheses
for the private equity borrowing advantage. Part V identifies
potential limitations on the gatekeeping role of private equity firms
and compares them to the more established debt-market gatekeepers,
the credit rating agencies. It concludes with a brief discussion of the
current regulatory implications of private equity firms’ gatekeeping
function. Finally, Appendix A provides a formal proof of the
gatekeeper thesis, modeling the interactions between private equity
firms and lenders as a repeated-game involving agency costs.
I.

The Private Equity Puzzle
A.

Background: Private Equity LBO Transactions

Although the term “private equity” may be used to refer to a
broad range of private investing, for purposes of this Article, private
equity is defined as the business of buying and selling whole
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companies, using (in part) borrowed money.20 A “private equity
firm” is a group of investment professionals that raises money from
investors21 and pools it in one or more investment vehicles (“private
equity funds”) for the purpose of engaging in private equity.22 When
a private equity fund acquires a company—a transaction referred to
as a “leveraged buyout” or “LBO”—only a portion of the acquisition
price, typically 10-40%, comes from its own pooled funds.23 The
remaining 60-90% of the purchase price is borrowed from third
parties.24 The borrower in an LBO is neither the private equity firm
nor the private equity fund, but rather the target company itself.25
The key characteristic of an LBO is that the target company is made
to borrow against its own assets to buy out existing shareholders.26
Thus, while the private equity firm negotiates the target company’s
debt terms with creditors, the creditors have recourse only to the
assets of the target, and not those of the private equity firm, the
private equity fund, or any other portfolio company of the private
equity firm.27 Upon completion of the acquisition (as depicted in
Figure 1 below), the private equity fund is the controlling
shareholder of a highly leveraged company, that is, one with a high
ratio of debt to equity.28
20

In other words, this Article focuses on a particular type of private equity
transaction, the leveraged buyout (“LBO”). LBO funds invest in mature
companies (in contrast to venture capital funds, which invest in start-ups)
by acquiring a controlling ownership interest in the company (in contrast to
hedge funds, which most typically make minority investments in publiclytraded corporations). Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 121.
21
Private equity firms raise these large pools of funds from institutional
investors (such as pension funds, university endowments, foreign
governments, etc.) and high net-worth individuals, who delegate to the
firms all authority to acquire and dispose of companies with the funds. Id. at
123.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 125.
24
Id. at 124.
25
APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 14.
26
19 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 2181 (2013) (“A ‘leveraged buyout’ or
LBO is a method of acquiring a company by which the acquirer leverages
(or borrows against) the assets of the target company to finance the
purchase of the target company’s shares from the selling shareholders.”).
27
APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 14.
28
An operating company’s leverage may be measured by either the ratio of
debt to equity or the ratio of debt to the accounting measure of earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (“EBITDA”). SIDNEY
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Figure 1. Private Equity Acquisition Structure (Simplified)29

A private equity firm manages one or more private equity
funds at once, and each such fund typically holds several companies
at once.30 Each portfolio company issues its own debt, which may
consist of senior loans (“bank debt”), high-yield bonds, mezzanine
debt, or some combination thereof.31 While the private equity fund is
the actual owner of the portfolio companies, the investors in a private
equity fund have a purely passive role.32 The private equity firm is
solely responsible for identifying acquisition targets,33 providing
S. GOLDSTEIN, 1 ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES § 12:31 (2013); Richard
Wight, Warren Cooke & Richard Gray, Understanding the Credit
Agreement, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 209,
298 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007). The distinction between
the two is irrelevant for purposes of this Article.
29
Solid arrows in the figure indicate ownership.
30
Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 9 (2008).
31
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 124–25.
32
In the United States, the private equity fund is most commonly organized
as a limited partnership, of which the private equity firm is the general
partner and the passive investors are the limited partners. Id. at 123.
33
Private equity funds may acquire both public companies (in a “going
private” transaction) and companies that are already privately held. Id. at
127–28.
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management services to any acquired companies (including by
negotiating their financings), and, after a few years, selling them off
again.34
Figure 2. Full Private Equity Ownership Structure (Simplified)

B.

Searching for Value in Private Equity

As private equity has expanded both in size and scope since
its beginnings in the 1980s, the debate as to its merits has
intensified.35 Immediately prior to the 2007 to 2008 financial crisis,
the characterization of private equity firms as “Barbarians at the
Gate”36 seemed to be a historical artifact. However, with the onset of
the financial crisis, the continuing economic difficulties in the United
States, and Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign, private equity

34

See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 13 (“The general partner makes
decisions about which properties or companies to buy, how they should be
managed, and when they should be sold.”). After owning a company for the
desired period (say, three to eight years), a private equity fund will
generally exit the investment in one of three ways by: (1) taking the
company public through an IPO, (2) selling it to another company seeking
to make a strategic acquisition (e.g., a large operating company looking for
synergies), or (3) selling it to another LBO fund (a “secondary LBO”).
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 129.
35
For a brief, non-technical review of the studies and theories on the costs
and benefits of private equity, see Davidoff, supra note 1, at B4.
36
BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE
FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990).
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once again became a focus of (largely negative) public scrutiny.37
This sub-part summarizes the extant literature and views on whether
private equity creates value.38
1.

Private Equity Skeptics

Skepticism about private equity boils down to the view that
private equity is nothing more than a transfer of wealth from less
sophisticated or less organized parties (such as selling shareholders,
dispersed creditors, workers, and taxpayers) to the pockets of private
equity professionals and, possibly, their investors.39
One form of such skepticism views private equity as pure
financial trickery.40 This view expresses surprise bordering on
disbelief that private equity firms appear to generate above-market
returns from their portfolio companies.41 The reason is simply that, to
casual observers, private equity firms do not appear to do much of
anything. They purchase companies, attend board meetings, and then
sell to the highest bidder after a few years.42 If capital markets are
efficient, this process should not lead to above-market returns for
private equity firms or their investors.43
Such skeptics are in fact correct that private equity firms
rarely implement drastic changes in their portfolio companies. While
37

See sources cited supra note 1.
The literature and press on private equity frequently conflate four
overlapping, yet distinct questions: (1) whether private equity generates
profits for private equity firms, (2) whether private equity generates profits
for investors in private equity funds, (3) whether private equity increases
social welfare overall, and (4) whether private equity creates any social
value (which may or may not result in a net increase in social welfare,
depending on the social costs that private equity imposes). This sub-part is
primarily concerned with the fourth question.
39
Robert J. Samuelson, The Private Equity Boom, WASH. POST (Mar. 15,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/14/
ar2007031402177.html.
40
E.g., Michael Gordon, Private Equity Boom Was a Clumsy Trick, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at 9.
41
Id.
42
Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 11.
43
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 122 (suggesting that private equity
firms generate profits—despite not increasing the value of portfolio
companies—by taking advantage of favorable market timing and market
mispricing).
38

126

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 33

they sit on their companies’ boards and provide them with advisory
services (usually related only to major corporate events such as
financings and acquisitions), they do not take over day-to-day
management duties of their companies.44 Nor do they consistently
replace management when they acquire a company—in fact, they
proudly advertise their goal of teaming up with existing management
when they make acquisitions and are viewed as friendlier to
management than other acquirers.45 To such a critic, then, private
equity necessarily involves a financial sleight-of-hand, either in the
buying or selling of companies (e.g., private equity firms are
consistently able to buy low and sell high only by preying on the
ignorance of public shareholders) or in the calculation or publication
of its returns.46
Under the second form of skepticism, the harms imposed by
private equity extend well beyond the financial realm.47 Here, private
equity is criticized for reducing social welfare by: (1) bankrupting
U.S. companies,48 (2) harming American workers,49 (3) pocketing
unjustified tax subsidies,50 or all of the above.
First, private equity firms are said to cause companies to take
on too much debt, and to use that debt solely for the benefit of the
44

Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 13 (explaining that while “general
partners can use their power at the board level to execute a swift executive
turnover,” they instead generally “opt for an advisory role”).
45
See Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and
Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 770–75
(2003) (describing the interest of private equity funds in “maintaining a
reputation for treating successful managers well”).
46
Even serious commentators argue that private equity investors may be
getting lower returns than private equity firms claim. See Dan McCrum,
Private Equity Fees Called into Question, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012 at 1.
However, this debate touches more on the division of profits between the
private equity managers (the investment professionals) and their investors
than on whether private equity generates value as a whole. Id.
47
Creswell, supra note 1, at A1.
48
Id. (blaming private equity firms for sending many U.S. companies into
bankruptcy).
49
Steven J. Davis et al., Private Equity and Employment 32 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17399, 2011), available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.davis/pdf/privateequityandemployme
nt.pdf (finding that “pre-existing employment positions are at greater risk of
loss in the wake of private equity buyouts”).
50
Surowiecki, supra note 1, at 21.
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private equity firm—whether explicitly (by issuing themselves a
large dividend)51 or implicitly (by using the debt to outbid other
potential acquirers of a company)52—rather than for the benefit of
the companies. By stripping cash out of U.S. companies, perhaps
private equity firms leave companies too susceptible to bankruptcy.53
Even if these companies manage to avoid bankruptcy, the argument
goes, they will be left with too little cash to invest in long-term,
value-creating projects, with negative long-term consequences for
the U.S. economy.54 On this view, private equity firms keep all of the
upside from their portfolio companies’ performance, while the
downside is borne by creditors and by the general public.

51

David Callahan, Bad Debts, Big Profits: How Private Equity Firms Turn
Red Ink into Gold, HUFFINGTON POST (May 23, 2013, 1:45 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-callahan/bad-debts-big-profitshow_b_1539328.html (explaining that private equity firms use debt to
“create a pile of cash, some of which they can direct their own way in the
form of management fees and dividends”).
52
Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing
Distorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1975, 1980 (2008) (arguing that debt financing provides private equity
firms with an advantage over other potential acquirers of a target company).
53
E.g., Surowiecki, supra note 1, at 21.
54
Several recent empirical projects offer serious challenges to these claims,
however. Private equity-owned portfolio companies are found to default on
their loans at the same or lower rates as comparable non-sponsored
companies. Edie Hotchkiss, David C. Smith & Per Strömberg, Private
Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress 23–24 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 331/2012, 2011); see also
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 129 (finding a lower default rate for
their sample of private equity-owned companies than for all U.S. corporate
bond issuers from 1980 to 2002). Further, the costs of financial distress
appear to be lower for private equity-owned companies, as they achieve
voluntary restructuring more often and, if that fails, spend less time in
bankruptcy. Hotchkiss et al., supra, at 23–24 (asserting that private equity
firms actively facilitate the restructuring of firms, and shorten the
bankruptcy process by pre-negotiating bankruptcy terms and aiding in the
screening process). Finally, several papers have produced evidence that
private equity portfolio companies innovate more, engage in more research
and development, and generally invest more (more efficiently) than their
public company counterparts. E.g., Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen & Per
Strömberg, Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case of
Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 445, 446, 474 (2011).
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Second, critics complain that the wealth of private equity
firms is generated at the expense of workers, who may be laid off en
masse following a private equity acquisition (or lose their jobs in a
future bankruptcy, as discussed above).55 Private equity firms may
indeed be slightly more willing to lay off workers than comparable
public companies.56 However, recent evidence suggests that these
layoffs are more than offset by the higher growth rates and
subsequent hiring of private equity-owned companies; on a net basis,
private equity firms create more jobs than comparable public
companies.57 Notwithstanding this evidence, it could still be the case
that private equity’s labor track record involves a net welfare loss, if
the unmeasured social costs from firing some workers (social unrest,
psychological distress, crime, etc.) are greater than the benefits of
creating more jobs overall.
Finally, private equity is criticized for exploiting two key
subsidies from U.S. taxpayers: (1) the deductibility of interest
payments and (2) the capital gains treatment of carried interest
payments. First, because private equity depends on the ability to
borrow substantial amounts of debt, it undeniably benefits from the
fact that interest payments on debt are generally tax-deductible for
corporations,58 while payments on stock—such as dividends and
redemptions—are not.59 The tax advantage of debt implies that
private equity firms may increase the value of their portfolio
companies simply by making greater use of leverage than public
companies tend to.60 Proponents of this view argue that private
equity’s success is entirely tax-driven, and what Congress gives,
Congress can (and perhaps should) take away.61 If the private equity
55

E.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Mother Jones Meets Gordon Gekko: The
Complicated Relationship Between Labor and Private Equity, 79 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1317, 1329–31 (2008).
56
Davis et al., supra note 49, at 5–7 (finding layoff rates at acquired
companies typically increase at rates slightly higher than “control”
companies (i.e., companies in similar financial situations that have not
undergone private equity takeovers)).
57
Id. at 4.
58
26 U.S.C. § 163(a) (2006).
59
BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.01 (2013).
60
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 131.
61
Surowiecki, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing that Congress should alter the
U.S. tax code to close the “loopholes” through which private equity firms
make money).
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value-add is simply causing companies to adopt a tax-efficient level
of debt, it is not necessarily a socially optimal one.
Second, private equity professionals pay tax on much of
their income at lower rates than they would as salaried workers.62 A
significant portion of the compensation of private equity managers
consists of the gains from selling their portfolio companies, referred
to as the “carried interest.”63 Currently, carried interest income is
treated as capital gains under the U.S. tax laws and is therefore
generally subject to tax at a reduced rate.64 Critics complain that the
carried interest is the product of the private equity managers’ labor,
not mere passive gain, and should therefore be treated as ordinary
income, which would be taxable at higher rates.65 On this view, the
capital gains treatment for carried interest income is an unjustified
subsidy to the private equity industry, allowing it to draw the best
and brightest young professionals away from the fields in which they
would otherwise have exercised their talents.66
2.

Proponents of Private Equity

Those who champion private equity adopt two strategies in
responding to critics. The first is to show that the claimed harms

62

Thomas J. Brennan & Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring the Tax Subsidy in
Private Equity and Hedge Fund Compensation, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 27, 39–
42 (2008); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private
Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715, 729–30 (2008).
63
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 124 (defining “carried interest” as
the share of profits of the fund a general partner earns, which frequently
equals almost 20%).
64
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED
INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART I, JCX-62-07, 3. This was the
explanation given by Mitt Romney for why his effective income tax rate is
so low. John D. McKinnon & Sara Murray, Romney Offers New Tax
Details, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2012, at A1.
65
E.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008).
66
For proposals to tax all or a portion of private equity’s carried interest
income as ordinary income, rather than as capital gains, see American Jobs
Act of 2011, H.R. 12, 112th Cong. § 412 (2011); American Jobs and
Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. Sess. § 412
(2010); H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007).
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imposed by private equity are either illusory or exaggerated.67 The
second is to identify sources of value from private equity, which
might more than offset its costs. This section summarizes arguments
employing the latter strategy.
If private equity firms rarely make major operational
changes to their portfolio companies, how can they possibly add
value? The literature suggests that private equity firms make certain
subtle changes that, while modest, have a measurable impact on
company performance.68 And the use of leverage magnifies the
return to shareholders from any such changes.
First and foremost, private equity provides an effective form
of corporate governance for its portfolio companies, particularly as
compared to the public company model.69 Private equity minimizes
the severe agency costs that exist with public company management
as a result of the separation of ownership (by dispersed shareholders)
and control (by hired management).70 As compared to dispersed
public shareholders, private equity firms may be better at both
monitoring and incentivizing management.71 Private equity firms
monitor management both directly and indirectly. First, private
equity firms appear to be more closely involved in management
oversight than the independent directors of public companies: their

67

For examples of this strategy, see supra note 54.
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 122–23; see generally Robert S.
Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven N. Kaplan, Private Equity Performance:
What Do We Know? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
17874, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17874 (indicating
that, empirically, private equity-owned companies outperform public
companies).
69
Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of Uncorporation 13–14 (Univ. of Chi. Coll.
of Law, Working Paper No. 83, 2007), available at http://law.bepress.
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1082&context=uiuclwps.
70
Id. at 3, 22.
71
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 131–32. The private equity
governance advantage may be increasing as a result of companies’ greater
use of derivatives in recent years. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas,
Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and
Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 245, 251
(2009). Recent work suggests that derivatives render companies more
opaque to their boards of directors, thus inhibiting the effective monitoring
of management, and that private equity sponsors are more experienced with
derivatives than public company boards. Id.
68
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portfolio companies have smaller boards that meet more frequently.72
Private equity firms also make available to their portfolio companies
financial and industry/operational expertise—they specialize in the
former, and often hire consultants or executives for the latter.73
Second, private equity firms are skilled at identifying
underperforming management and, when necessary, replacing
them.74 Yet the most effective form of monitoring by private equity
firms is an indirect one—namely, the disciplining effect of the very
high leverage that they impose on their portfolio companies.75 The
constant pressure of having to make regular interest and amortization
payments on the company’s debt is thought to keep management
focused on maximizing cash flow and firm value.76 Further, it
eliminates the inefficiencies that arise from having significant cash
on hand, which management may be tempted either to hoard for selfinterested reasons or to spend on bad projects.77
In addition, private equity firms incentivize management
differently from publicly traded companies: (1) they require
managers to invest more of their own money in the company (to
have more “skin in the game”);78 (2) a greater proportion of
management’s compensation is awarded in the form of equity;79 and
72

Francesca Cornelli & Ōguzhan Karakas, Private Equity and Corporate
Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards?, in 1 THE
GLOBALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS WORKING PAPERS
VOLUME 1: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT
2008 65, 72 (World Econ. Forum 2008), available at http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_IV_PrivateEquity_Report_2008.pdf.
73
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 132. The case for the contribution
of financial and industry experts may well be overstated, however, given
how leanly staffed private equity firms are. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of
the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 70.
74
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 132 (explaining one study’s
finding that in companies with “poorly performing management . . . onethird of chief executive officers . . . are replaced in the first 100 days while
two-thirds are replaced at some point over a four-year period.”).
75
Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 324; Stewart C. Myers, Still Searching for Optimal Capital
Structure, 6 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4, 14 (1993).
78
Kate Burgess & Peter Smith, Shareholders Split on C&W’s Private
Equity-Style Pay Plan, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2006, at 23.
79
Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 251–52.
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(3) the equity awarded to management is comparatively illiquid
(since it cannot be cashed out until an event such as an IPO or other
sale of the company occurs), which reduces management’s
incentives to manipulate short-term financial results and keeps it
focused on longer-term results.80
Second, private equity leads to a more efficient market for
corporate control.81 At base, LBOs consist of the buying and selling
of corporate control and, by deepening the takeover market, should
render it more efficient.82 And this is so quite apart from the merits
of any particular ownership model. While private equity may well
constitute a superior governance model to public shareholding for the
reasons discussed above, these benefits are not necessary for private
equity to render companies more efficient. The mere threat of being
acquired should cause companies (more specifically, management)
to perform better. Although private equity is presented as a rival to
publicly traded stock, the relationship is more accurately described
as symbiotic. Buyout funds depend on the existence of inefficient
public companies to make outsized returns.83 Therefore, the private
equity model not only competes with, but relies on, the public
company model. In this way, the LBO market provides a de facto
check on the inefficiencies of public ownership.84

80

Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 130–31.
M. Todd Henderson & Richard A. Epstein, The Going-Private
Phenomenon: Causes and Implications, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009)
(arguing that ensuring private equity remains “a vibrant component of the
market for corporate control which is so essential to the efficient operation
of public companies”).
82
Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 9, 23–24 (1983).
83
Jensen, supra note 73, at 65.
84
In keeping with the thesis of this Article, the same point can be made
slightly differently. Private equity consists of a form of arbitrage that should
lead to more efficient capital markets. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra at note 8,
at 137–38. One of the skills developed by private equity firms is the ability
to recognize and act on “mispricings” between the debt and equity markets.
Id. Specifically, buyout funds time the debt markets to borrow cheaply in
order to acquire inefficient and undervalued public companies. Id. In that
manner, private equity funds effectively capitalize on inefficiencies in the
debt markets to correct inefficiencies in the equity markets. Id. As
arbitrageurs of the two types of capital markets, private equity funds serve
the useful purpose not only of eventually reducing price discrepancies
81
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Third, in taking public companies private, private equity
yields cost savings by avoiding public-company securities law
disclosure and compliance requirements (such as Sarbanes-Oxley)85
and arguably by shielding management from frivolous shareholder
lawsuits.86 Of course, this benefit exists only while the company
remains private, whereas the benefits of private equity-driven
operational changes appear to persist for at least several years after
the company goes public again.87 Further, these cost savings may
well be overstated, as many of the larger private equity portfolio
companies voluntarily engage in public financial reporting in any
event, for example when they issue public bonds.88 More
importantly, the net social value of these costs savings is unclear, as
it depends on the value to society of mandatory information
disclosure.
Weighing the evidence on both sides, the academic literature
for the most part concludes—tentatively—that private equity is, on
net, a positive phenomenon.89 Yet private equity may well be too
recent and protean a phenomenon for definitive conclusions to be
drawn. The work of measuring the known costs and benefits of
private equity has only recently begun in earnest, and, I argue, we
have overlooked one such benefit entirely. This Article corrects this
oversight in the next Part, by identifying an additional way in which
private equity creates value.

between the two markets, but also of directly bringing to the market’s
attention ineffective management in public companies. Id.
85
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
86
Henderson & Epstein, supra note 81, at 3.
87
Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 224 n.25.
88
Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the
Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 7, 43 (2009) (finding that “after [Sarbanes-Oxley], private bidders are
actually more likely to subject themselves to continuing SEC reporting
obligations . . . when structuring a large-scale take-private transaction”).
89
E.g., Henderson & Epstein, supra note 81, at 5 (opining that the current
assessment of private equity is “positive and promising but complex and
nuanced”); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 143 (concluding that
“[t]he empirical evidence is strong that private equity activity creates
economic value on average”).
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Claims and Assumptions

In the midst of a global recession, with the scarcity of capital
still widely decried, a private equity consortium led by TPG Capital
was able to borrow $1.6 billion to acquire the apparel retailer J.Crew
in one of the biggest leveraged buyouts of 2011, valued at
approximately $3.1 billion.90 J.Crew went from a pre-acquisition
capital structure with no material debt to one financed with 60%
debt.91 Despite such high leverage, TPG was able to negotiate the
debt on highly favorable terms. Although rated speculative grade due
to the high leverage, the J.Crew loans had certain borrower-friendly
features that were then rarely extended even to borrowers with
investment-grade rated loans.92 What can account for these favorable
debt terms? And is this a good thing?
The primary claim of this Article is that private equity firms
create value by acting as gatekeepers in the debt markets. As repeat
players in the debt markets, private equity firms have the reputational
incentive to minimize the credit risk of their portfolio companies,
and they do so by acting as both “certification intermediaries”93 and
what I will refer to as “monitoring intermediaries” between their
portfolio companies and creditors.
From this primary claim follows a secondary one: private
equity-owned companies have not only a governance advantage, but
also a borrowing advantage.94 If the gatekeeper hypothesis is correct,
90

J.Crew Grp., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 14, (June 22, 2011)
[hereinafter J.Crew S-4]; Michael J. de la Merced, J.Crew Shareholders
Approve $3 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2011, at B5.
91
J.Crew S-4, supra note 90, at 14.
92
In particular, the J.Crew term loans were “covenant-lite,” meaning that
the company was not required to maintain leverage at or below a certain
threshold throughout the term of the loan. See id. at F-24. Instead, the
company is only subject to a leverage test at the time that it seeks to incur
additional debt. Id. at II-6, Exhibit 10.2 (Credit Agreement), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1051251/000119312511062380/de
x102.htm (Section 7.03 of the agreement outlines the conditions under
which the firm may incur additional debt but does not include a leverage
requirement).
93
Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916,
918 (1998).
94
Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 24.
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all else being equal a private equity-owned company should be able
to borrow money on more favorable terms than a standalone
company, due to its lower credit risk. (The claim is not that private
equity portfolio companies on average obtain loans on better terms
than other companies. Private equity-backed companies on the whole
take on significantly more leverage than otherwise comparable
companies, and are therefore riskier from a lender’s perspective. All
else being equal, this should entail worse loan terms for the
borrower. Returning to the example above, the claim is instead that
J.Crew could not have borrowed as much as it did under TPG had it
remained a public company, or could only have done so on far less
favorable terms.)
Several clarifications of this secondary claim are in order.
First, what is meant by borrowing “on more favorable terms”?
Simply that a private equity-owned company will either be able to
borrow more money than its standalone counterpart (on otherwise
the same terms), or that it will be able to borrow the same amount of
money but with more borrower-friendly provisions, such as a lower
interest rate, lower fees, a longer maturity, or less restrictive
conditions, covenants, and events of default.95 If correct, the thesis
entails that private equity firms provide the valuable function of
lowering companies’ cost of debt capital.
Second, “all else being equal” means that, other than with
respect to their ownership (private equity-sponsored versus nonsponsored), the companies are identical from a creditor’s
perspective. In other words, we assume that at the time at which they
are compared, the companies have identical operating and financial
characteristics, identical types and amounts of debt in their capital
structure, identical management and incentive plans for management,
identical information about the company available to creditors, and
so forth. These assumptions are not intended to approximate
reality;96 they simply serve to isolate the effect of reputation on debt
terms.

95

Id. at 24; Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 256.
Private equity firms have substantially more leverage than otherwise
comparable companies, and, when one compares them to public companies,
they are thought to exhibit better governance and make less information
available to creditors. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 255–56; see
Whitehead, supra note 15, at 664 (describing how less information is
available about private borrowers than public).
96
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Gatekeeping in the Financial Markets—A
Framework

Gatekeepers are broadly understood to be private actors that
can prevent companies’ misconduct in a specific market.97 The
precise definition of a gatekeeper is somewhat elusive, however, as
the gatekeeper literature has evolved in two directions. The first,
associated with Reinier Kraakman, defines a gatekeeper as any party
from whom a company needs a good or service, and who can prevent
the company’s misconduct simply by refusing to provide it.98 The
second, associated primarily with John Coffee, defines a gatekeeper
as “a reputational intermediary who provides verification or
certification services to investors.”99 The first is broad enough to
cover all types of markets and is agnostic as to the gatekeeper’s
incentive for preventing company misconduct—on this view, any
party from whom the company needs a good or service can be made
a gatekeeper, simply by imposing liability on such party for the
company’s misconduct.100 The second pertains only to the financial
markets and stipulates that the gatekeeper’s incentive to intervene is
its reputation in the market with investors.101 For the remainder of
this Article, the term “gatekeeper” will mean a reputational
intermediary in one or more financial markets, in accordance with
Coffee’s understanding of the term.
The key to identifying gatekeepers is understanding why
gatekeepers are needed in the first place. In the financial markets,
dispersed investors have imperfect information about companies and
limited control over them, and companies can exploit this asymmetry
by misrepresenting their quality to investors or by engaging in
misconduct undetected. Because investors are aware of this
possibility ex ante, they will invest less and will do so on less
97

Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986).
98
Id. at 53.
99
John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004). Though
this version of the gatekeeper definition is associated with John Coffee, the
concept of a reputational intermediary originated with Ron Gilson and
Reinier Kraakman. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 618 (1984).
100
Kraakman, supra note 97, at 61–66.
101
Coffee, supra note 99, at 302.
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company-favorable terms than they would in the presence of perfect
information and control.102 This makes both investors and companies
worse off.103 A gatekeeper can step in to bridge this gap between
investors and companies by staking its reputation as to companies’
quality or conduct, as applicable.104 Gatekeeping therefore provides
the socially valuable function of facilitating a more efficient level of
investment.105
The gatekeeper literature offers an array of different
frameworks and approaches for identifying gatekeepers and
assessing their performance.106 I distill these into a simple framework
comprising three basic requirements for a gatekeeper in a financial
market:
(1) the market at issue must exhibit some
inefficiency resulting from information and/or
control problems between companies and
investors;107
(2) the proposed gatekeeper must have the incentive
to mitigate the problem(s);108 and
(3) the proposed gatekeeper must have the ability to
mitigate the problem(s).109

102

See Choi, supra note 93, at 933.
Id. at 933–34 (explaining “social welfare is reduced relative to the
perfect information case because purchasers willing to purchase highquality goods at above the cost of production are unable to do so”).
104
Coffee, supra note 99, at 308.
105
See Choi, supra note 93, at 946–47.
106
See generally Choi, supra note 93; Coffee, supra note 99; Ronald J.
Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper
Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on
Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers To Improve the Regulation of Financial
Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1993); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers
Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (2008); Frank Partnoy,
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers? A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple
Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010).
107
Tuch, supra note 106, at 1594–95.
108
Kraakman, supra note 97, at 62.
109
Kim, supra note 106, at 414. In addition, it cannot be the case that all of
the companies in the market have the exact same ex ante quality and ex post
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This framework will be applied in Part III to private equity firms’
role in the debt markets.
C.

Broadening the Gatekeeper Concept

By now, it will have occurred to the reader that private
equity firms are atypical candidates for gatekeeping. Indeed, much of
the gatekeeper literature either implicitly or explicitly assumes that
gatekeepers are independent professional organizations,110 which
have the power to prevent companies’ misconduct because they
provided them with a needed service.111 The conception of
gatekeepers as third-party service providers is plain in the most
commonly proffered example of gatekeeping, namely the
requirement that start-up companies obtain comfort letters from
nationally-recognized accounting firms in order to complete an
IPO.112
A private equity firm is clearly not a third party from the
perspective of its portfolio companies. As the entity with sole control
of the company, it may well be the consummate insider. Nor is it
fundamentally a service provider to its companies. In the context of
debt financing, the company does not seek out the private equity firm
to negotiate its debt; rather, the private equity firm causes the
company to take on debt in the first place.113
Is being a strictly independent third party a fundamental
requirement for gatekeeping or merely a common characteristic of
gatekeepers in practice? From a functional perspective, there is no
reason why insiders should be dismissed out of hand as potential
gatekeepers. So long as they satisfy the fundamental goal of
financial-market gatekeeping—limiting the degree to which
companies exploit their information advantage over investors—the
terminology can and should be expanded to cover insiders.
Accordingly, recent work argues that even inside counsel can act as
performance. See generally Choi, supra note 93. This assumption is clearly
satisfied in practice.
110
Coffee, supra note 99, at 302 (describing gatekeepers as “independent
professionals”).
111
Gilson, supra note 106, at 883 (claiming that a gatekeeper must provide
“some service which the wrongdoer must have to accomplish his goal”).
112
Coffee, supra note 99, at 302.
113
APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 13–15.
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gatekeepers for their companies, under certain conditions.114
Strict independence is not necessary for successful
gatekeeping; all that is required is a sufficient divergence of the
gatekeeper’s incentives and those of management, so that the
baseline incidence of company misconduct is reduced.115 Although
private equity firms closely monitor the officers of their portfolio
companies, they do not actually exercise management of the day-today business of the company, leaving that instead to hired officers.116
While such managers might benefit from a one-time event in which
they mislead creditors, for example, the private equity firm will
benefit less, due to the long-term reputational harm from doing so.117
Thus, the incentives of private equity firms do not perfectly overlap
with those of management, and this mismatch enables private equity
firms to act as gatekeepers, by constraining management’s behavior
toward creditors to at least some degree.
To conclude, whether private equity firms can be referred to
as gatekeepers should depend only on whether they are successful at
the task, which is addressed in the following three Parts.
III.

Private Equity Gatekeeping: Application

This Part III applies the gatekeeping framework introduced
above to demonstrate that private equity firms act as gatekeepers in
the debt markets with respect to their portfolio companies. The three
requirements for successful gatekeeping—the existence of
information and/or control problems limiting investment in the
market and of a gatekeeper with both the incentive and the ability to
mitigate these problems—are satisfied because: (1) the debt markets
suffer from the agency costs of adverse selection ex ante and moral
hazard ex post, which lenders are increasingly unable to control on

114

Gilson, supra note 106, at 883; Kim, supra note 106, at 413.
See Coffee, supra note 99, at 304.
116
STEPHANIE R. BRESLOW & PHYLLIS A. SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE EQUITY
FUNDS: FORMATION AND OPERATION 1:19–1:20 (Practising Law Institute
2013).
117
I readily concede that the degree to which a gatekeeper is independent
from the company will likely impact the calculus involved in determining
whether to impose gatekeeper liability and in what form, but it is less
relevant for pure market-based gatekeepers, such as private equity firms.
115
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their own;118 (2) as repeat players in the debt markets, private equity
firms have the reputational incentive to exert efforts to mitigate these
agency costs in their portfolio companies;119 and (3) private equity
firms have the ability to mitigate these agency costs through their
extensive knowledge of, and control over, these companies.120 Each
of these three requirements is discussed in turn below.
A.

The Agency Costs of Debt

That some degree of information asymmetry exists between
companies and investors is uncontroversial: even with the largest
public companies, which are required by law to disclose all
“material” information to the public, may have a long and wellestablished track record, and whose stock and bonds are heavily
traded, management will always know more about their companies’
prospects than will investors.121 Separately, passive investors
exercise only imperfect control over companies.122 In the debt
markets specifically, information asymmetry and limited investor
control together give rise to two well-known sources of inefficiency,
referred to collectively as the agency costs of debt.123
1.

Adverse Selection

First, information asymmetry between borrowing companies
and creditors leads to adverse selection among borrowers.124 If
creditors are unable to perfectly discern a borrower’s quality, they
will offer loans to borrowers on terms that correspond to the average
expected quality of borrowers in the market.125 Because high-quality
borrowers are disadvantaged by this outcome while low-quality
borrowers benefit from it, higher-quality borrowers may begin to exit
the market while lower-quality borrowers will try to borrow more
118

Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design:
Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 62, 68 (2013).
119
Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 239.
120
Id. at 253–54.
121
Id. at 246–47.
122
Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259,
268–69 (2010).
123
Jensen, supra note 75, at 323.
124
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2 (2006).
125
Choi, supra note 93, at 933.
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than they otherwise would.126 As the quality of borrowers in the
market declines, lenders will respond by offering less favorable debt
terms to borrowers, to reflect the change in average borrower
quality.127 This will cause still more high-quality borrowers to exit
the market and debt terms to further worsen, and so on.128 The upshot
for borrowing companies is that, as a whole, they will receive
fewer/smaller loans and on worse terms than they would if creditors
had perfect information about their quality.129
2.

Moral Hazard

The second agency cost of debt is that of borrower moral
hazard. While adverse selection arises ex ante (before the money has
been loaned), moral hazard arises ex post. Once borrowers have the
money in hand, they have incentives to act in ways that favor their
shareholders over their creditors.130 This problem, also referred to as
the shareholder-creditor conflict, results from shareholders and
creditors having differing claims on a company’s assets.131 As the
residual claimants of a corporation, shareholders receive all of the
upside from corporate actions (once liabilities have been repaid),
whereas creditors can, at most, get back the amount that they loaned,
plus the agreed-upon interest and fees.132 For both groups, losses are
limited to the money they put into the company (which, in the case

126

Whitehead, supra note 15, at 664–66.
See Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry,
Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical
Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACC. & ECON. 405, 408 (2001).
128
See Choi, supra note 93, at 943–945 (providing a simple model of
adverse selection applicable to any market in which company quality
varies).
129
See TIROLE, supra note 124, at 114 for a model of credit rationing. Under
certain conditions, adverse selection can cause all higher-quality companies/
producers to exit the market, leaving only low-quality ones. George A.
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970).
130
George Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and
Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155, 2158 (1994).
131
Id.
132
Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1927 (2013).
127
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of the company’s management, may be nothing at all).133 As a result,
shareholders have incentives to cause the company to divert wealth
from creditors, for example, by pursuing excessively risky projects
(particularly if the company is near insolvency), distributing assets to
the shareholders as dividends, or issuing additional debt of the same
or higher priority as that of its existing creditors.134
As with adverse selection, the existence of moral hazard
results in borrowers obtaining less favorable debt terms ex ante.135
3.

Traditional Creditor Responses to Agency
Costs

Clearly, the presence of borrower adverse selection and
moral hazard has not caused the corporate debt markets to unravel,
largely because creditors have developed strategies to deal with these
agency costs.
In the case of adverse selection, the traditional approach is
for creditors to expend resources on screening the borrower prior to
lending in order to more accurately discern the borrower’s credit risk
(and without relying solely on the borrower’s good faith).136
133

James C. Spindler, How Private is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 326 (2009).
134
Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting:
An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979).
135
The finance literature lacks a comprehensive model for how debt terms
are determined. Victoria Ivashina & Zheng Sun, Institutional Demand
Pressure and the Cost of Corporate Loans, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 500, 510
(2011) (stating “the current literature does not have a defined set of loanpricing factors”). Yet the primary determinant of a borrower’s debt terms is
undoubtedly its credit risk (that is, the likelihood that creditors will recover
the amount that they lend to the borrower). OCC, COMPTROLLER’S
HANDBOOK: RATING CREDIT RISK 21 (2001). A borrower’s credit risk is for
the most part a function of the operational characteristics and performance
of the borrower (cash flow, industry sector, etc.), the capital structure of the
borrower (in particular, its leverage), and features of the proposed debt itself
(priority, security, guarantees, maturity). Id. at 21–22. Beyond credit risk,
other determinants of a borrower’s debt terms should include liquidity risk
(the ease with which a creditor can transfer its interest in the borrower’s
debt to another creditor), prevailing market-wide yields, transaction costs,
relative bargaining power between the borrower and the creditors, and so
forth. Id.
136
TIROLE, supra note 124, at 87–88.
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Creditors screen borrowers primarily in two ways: (1) by performing
due diligence on the company prior to lending and (2) by
maintaining long-term lending relationships with their borrowers.137
In the case of moral hazard, creditors have primarily employed two
methods to limit borrower misconduct: (1) direct monitoring and (2)
debt covenants.138
Monitoring. Under the traditional model of bank lending, in
which a single bank extends the loan to the borrowing company and
holds the loan to maturity, the bank has both the incentive and the
ability to monitor the borrower closely.139 Banks have thus
historically had a cost advantage in monitoring borrowers, making
banks the intermediary of choice to whom the task of direct
monitoring was delegated.140
Debt Covenants. All corporate borrowings are subject to
covenants made by the company to its creditors.141 The term
“covenants” here refers broadly to all of the contractual provisions in
credit agreements, indentures, notes, and other debt contracts that
restrict the borrower’s activities or require it to take certain actions
deemed desirable by its creditors.142 The value of covenants to
creditors (and thus to borrowers) is obvious when one recalls that
there is no legal prohibition on companies favoring shareholders at
the expense of creditors—quite the contrary. While shareholders are
owed fiduciary duties by the directors143 and officers144 of the

137

Id.; Whitehead, supra note 15, at 665–66.
Whitehead, supra note 15, at 664–65.
139
Id. at 651–53.
140
Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated
Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393, 393 (1984).
141
See TIROLE, supra note 124, at 105 (describing covenants as “the heart of
a loan agreement”).
142
Id. at 83–86, 103–05. Thus, “covenants” in this informal sense will
include typical categories of debt contract provisions such as financial
covenants, negative covenants, affirmative covenants, events of default,
representations and warranties, and borrowing conditions precedent. Id.
143
See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90–91 (Del. 2001)
(affirming that directors’ duty of care may not be waived in Delaware);
Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 23, 2009) (holding the same with respect to directors’ duty of loyalty).
144
E.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009)
(explicitly recognizing that officers of Delaware corporations have fiduciary
duties to shareholders).
138
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corporation, creditors are not.145 Thus, borrowers are not liable for
misconduct toward their creditors unless they voluntarily assume
contractual liability, which is the principle behind covenants.146
4.

The Decline of Monitoring and Covenants

Today, however, monitoring and covenants are receding in
the debt markets. Public debt has always relied less heavily on
monitoring and covenants than has private debt, for reasons that will
become clear below.147 Yet as a result of sweeping changes to the
private debt markets over the last three decades, monitoring and
covenants are declining in the private market as well, which makes
up the vast majority of corporate debt.148
The driving force is the rapid adoption of the practice of loan
syndication, in which corporate loans, rather than being held by a
single bank until maturity, are instead funded from the outset by
large numbers of creditors.149 Post-issuance, syndicated loans may be
traded to still more creditors on an increasingly liquid secondary

145

The lone exception to this general rule applies if the company becomes
insolvent, in which case the directors’ fiduciary duties are for the benefit of
creditors. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92,101–03 (Del. 2007); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns, 621 A.2d 784,
787–88 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155–57 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
146
The theory behind these provisions was first expounded in a seminal
article relating to bond covenants. Smith & Warner, supra note 134, at 117.
Lenders ask for, and borrowers covenant to abide by, such provisions
because they maximize the value of the company by optimally addressing
moral hazard. The tradeoff is between (1) giving management free reign to
extort money from lenders (which would cause lenders not to extend any
credit to the company, or only at exorbitant rates) and (2) giving lenders
100% control of the company (which would lead to poor performance). Id.
147
See generally Whitehead, supra note 15.
148
Id. at 662 (describing the increase in “cov-lite” loans since 2005). For
ease of presentation, throughout this discussion the term “public debt”
should be thought of as publicly traded bonds, while “private debt” should
be thought of as senior corporate loans (or “bank debt,” as practitioners
refer to it).
149
Id. For a description of the loan syndication process, see Ivashina & Sun,
supra note 135, at 503–08.
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market, in which banks now represent a small minority.150 Corporate
loans, once the near-exclusive province of banks, are now routinely
held by an ever-widening array of financial institutions, including
mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, finance companies,
pension funds, foreign institutions, and securitization vehicles, such
as collateralized loan obligation (“CLO”) funds.151 While a
syndicated loan is still typically negotiated between the borrowing
company and a single bank, known as the “lead arranger,”152 it is
ultimately funded by a large number of lenders (the “syndicate”)
gathered by the lead arranger.153 By the end of the syndication
process, the lead arranger may end up holding only a very small
piece of the loan or none at all.154
Decline in monitoring. What happens to the monitoring
function of creditors when bank debt is syndicated? As the number
150

GLENN YAGO & DONALD MCCARTHY, MILKEN INST., THE U.S.
LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET: A PRIMER 26–27 (2004).
151
Bartlett, supra note 52, at 2013; YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at
26–27.
152
Lead arranger positions for large syndicated loans tend to be
monopolized by large investment or commercial banks. Barry Bobrow,
Mercedes Tech & Linda Redding, The Primary Market, in THE HANDBOOK
OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 155, 172 (Allison Taylor & Alicia
Sansone eds., 2006) (stating that the top three lead arrangers together
covered 47% of the total syndicated loan market in 2005); Anil Shivdasani
& Yihui Wang, Did Structured Credit Fuel the LBO Boom?, 66 J. FIN.
1291, 1306 (2011) (finding that after 2004, the top ten LBO lenders held a
94% share of the market in LBO lending). According to the Loan Pricing
Corporation, in the first quarter of 2012, the top three bookrunners held
44% of the market share. Press Release, Loan Prod. Co., Refinancings
Drive 1Q12 Leveraged Lending, M&A Absent (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
https://www.loanpricing.com/2012/07/refinancings-drive-1q12-leveragedlending-ma-absent/.
153
Under the traditional one-bank-one-borrower model, the bank acts as an
intermediary between the borrower and its ultimate creditors, the bank’s
depositors. Diamond, supra note 140, at 393. Under the syndication model,
the lead arranger serves as the intermediary between the borrower and the
rest of the syndicate—a form of secondary intermediation. Katerina Simons,
Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 45, 46 (Jan./Feb.
1993).
154
Jian Cai, Competition or Collaboration? The Reciprocity Effect in Loan
Syndication 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 0909R, 2010), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/
2009/wp0909r.pdf.
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of creditors grows, creditors’ incentives to monitor the borrower
decline, due to a familiar free-rider problem.155 Any given member
of a large lending syndicate will have little incentive to monitor the
borrower because direct monitoring is costly, and any benefit
therefrom will have to be shared among all of the creditors.156 Each
syndicate member will thus prefer to free-ride on the efforts of
others. Therefore, the growth of syndication is predictably
accompanied by a decline in the direct monitoring of borrowers.
Nor can this void in monitoring be filled simply by
delegating the task to the lead arranger of the syndicate.157 To begin
with, lead arrangers are equally subject to the free-rider problem in
that the benefits of their monitoring would be shared with all lenders.
(Recall that lead arrangers may hold only a small portion of the loans
that they arrange, if any.) Because the results of monitoring effort on
the lead arranger’s part are particularly difficult to observe and
measure, the other syndicate members cannot simply compensate the
lead arranger to monitor the borrower on their behalf.158 Thus, the
growth of syndication has gone hand in hand with a decline in the
monitoring of borrowers.
Decline in covenants. The move from a single-bank to a
loan-syndication model introduces new transaction costs to the
155

Shivdasani & Wang, supra note 152, at 1315–16; Hugh Thomas &
Zhiqiang Wang, The Integration of Bank Syndicated Loan and Junk Bond
Markets, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 229, 306 (2004). For the original description
of collective action problems, see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, in HARVARD
ECONOMIC STUDIES 124 (1965).
156
Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements:
Evidence from Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 641–42 (2007). It is for
this reason that publicly traded bonds do not involve creditor monitoring.
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 469 (1998–1999)
(explaining that a “bond indenture will contain few covenants; and those
that appear entail little monitoring”).
157
Thomas & Wang, supra note 155, at 306 (stating that the lead arranger
for a syndicated loan is not tasked with monitoring the borrower, but rather
performs a relatively mechanical role with very little discretion).
158
Sufi, supra note 156, at 641–42. Again, the analogy to publicly traded
bonds is a useful one. The trustee of a bond issuance is paid compensation
by the bondholders, yet for the most part performs only a ministerial role.
Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma
of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1044 (2008).
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corporate loan market: the same renegotiation and holdout costs that
arise with widely dispersed public bonds.159 As the number of
creditors holding a loan increases, so do the costs of making changes
to the loan terms due to a collective action problem among the
lenders.160 If the borrower needs to obtain a waiver or an amendment
to the loan terms, it must obtain the consent of a large group of
disparate and unrelated lenders, instead of negotiating with a single
bank.161 This may prove either impossible or prohibitively expensive,
even though all parties would prefer the proposed change to the loan
terms to the alternative of bankruptcy, or it may prevent the borrower
from pursuing a value-creating transaction.162 Because this collective
action problem can decrease the value of the company, lenders
rationally agree ex ante to more permissive covenants in the credit
agreement in order to decrease the likelihood that the borrower will
default on the loan or require other changes to its terms.163 This is
exactly what occurs in the public debt markets, where disparate and
uncoordinated ownership entails substantially looser covenants.164

159

See Amihud et al., supra note 156, at 467–78 (describing transaction
costs associated with public bonds).
160
Id. at 459–60.
161
Robert O. Wienke, Loan Syndications and Participations: Trends and
Tactics, 9 COM. LENDING REV. 4, 22 (1993–1994).
162
Id. at 24. In addition, the creditor that holds out the longest is likely to
get the biggest payout from the borrower, so all creditors have an incentive
to delay. John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion:
The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and
Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1238 (1991).
163
Alan M. Christenfeld & Barbara M. Goodstein, Covenant-Lite Loans
Rise Again, 250 N.Y. L.J. 67 (2013); Stephen Foley, Covenant Lite Loans
Lose Their Stigma in the Hunt for Yield, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2013, at 12.
164
Christenfeld & Goodstein, supra note 163. A simple example may help
illustrate the point. Assume that a company borrows from a single bank, and
that the credit agreement contains a financial covenant requiring the
borrower not to exceed a leverage ratio of 4 to 1 at any time while the loan
remains outstanding. This covenant may be set at a slightly optimistic level,
with the implicit understanding that the borrower can return to the bank to
negotiate a new covenant level if it ends up proving necessary. Now, if the
company were to refinance this loan with a syndicated loan funded by a
large number of creditors, the new credit agreement could conceivably
require only that the borrower not exceed a leverage ratio of 3 to 1. The
more permissive covenant level in this instance reflects the creditors’
understanding of the inefficiencies involved in renegotiating credit
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Thus, the onset of loan syndication has required a loosening of
covenants in borrowers’ credit agreements.165
The benefits of loan syndication and secondary trading are
obvious: greater diversification for lenders and greater access to
capital for borrowers.166 Yet syndication exacerbates adverse
selection and moral hazard in the loan market by prompting a decline
in monitoring and covenants.167 The key implication of this
fundamental change in the nature of corporate lending is that private
equity’s gatekeeping role in the debt markets should be increasingly
valuable to lenders. If private equity firms can fill the monitoring
void left by lenders, their portfolio companies will reap the benefits
of cheaper debt.
B.

Private Equity Firms’ Incentive to Mitigate
Agency Costs

In order for private equity firms to qualify as gatekeepers,
creditors must have some assurance that private equity firms will
exercise efforts to mitigate the agency costs of debt. This sub-part
argues that, because they are high-volume, repeat players in the debt
markets, private equity firms have strong reputational incentives to
ensure that their portfolio companies behave as “good” borrowers.
Therefore, they can credibly commit to mitigating both adverse
selection (by acting as certification intermediaries) and moral hazard
(by acting as monitoring intermediaries) in their portfolio companies.

agreement terms, which may more than offset the benefits of tighter control
of the borrower.
165
Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Role of Private Equity
Group Reputation in LBO Financing, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 306–09 (2010).
For example, in their sample of 183 going-private LBOs, the authors found
that no private equity firm had a “covenant-lite” loan (an exceptionally
borrower-favorable type of loan) before 2004, while nearly 60% did
through part of 2007. Id. at 315. In volume terms, they report that covenantlite loans in LBO financings grew from $0 in 2000 to over $93 billion in the
first half of 2007. Id. at 307.
166
See Bobrow et al., supra note 152, at 176.
167
Miguel Meuleman, Mike Wright, Sophie Manigart & Andy Lockett,
Private Equity Syndication: Agency Costs, Reputation and Collaboration,
36 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 616, 620 (2009).
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Repeat Players

Though private equity firms themselves do not borrow for
acquisitions, they are nonetheless high-volume, repeat players in the
debt markets.168 On behalf of their many portfolio companies, they
negotiate more frequent borrowing, and of greater amounts, than do
standalone companies.169 A single private equity firm should
generate significantly more borrowing volume than a standalone
company because it manages several borrowing companies at once,
each of which is more highly leveraged than a typical standalone
company.170
First, a typical private equity-owned portfolio company
borrows far more than an otherwise identical standalone company.171

168

Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2466.
See id. at 2462–63 (explaining that “LBO firms are important clients for
banks because of the frequency and scale of their transactions”).
170
I propose yet another reason why the volume of a private equity firm’s
borrowing should outweigh that of a standalone company: one might expect
LBO portfolio companies to refinance their loans more frequently than
other companies. Because they are more highly leveraged, LBO portfolio
companies are more sensitive to interest rates and should therefore seek to
refinance more often as the prevailing market interest rate margin changes.
Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Buyout Groups Set Refinancing Record, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at 13 (describing an increase in private equity
refinancings in an attempt to “lock into low interest rates”). Further, a
portfolio company’s debt must be refinanced when the company is
ultimately sold by the LBO fund (due to a standard credit agreement
provision requiring the repayment of the loan upon a change of control of
the borrower), which occurs relatively frequently. See Wight et al., supra
note 28, at 346, 350–51. Indeed, all LBO funds have a limited lifespan of,
say, ten years. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 123. If a portfolio
company is acquired in year seven of the fund’s existence, and the debt
incurred in connection with the acquisition has a maturity of, say, six years,
the debt will have to be refinanced only five years into its term at the latest.
171
Recent work found that out of a sample of 1157 leveraged buyout
companies and matched public companies, the median leverage ratio
(measured as the ratio of net debt to EBITDA) for private equity-owned
companies was 0.70, as compared to 0.35 for public companies. Ulf
Axelson, Tim Jenkinson, Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, Borrow
Cheap, Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts,
68 J. FIN. 2223, 2239 (2013) (showing in Table IV “the median values of
net debt . . . to enterprise value . . . and net debt to earnings before interest,
169
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Although it is commonly accepted that private equity-owned
companies are highly leveraged, less thought has been given to why
this is so. Recent contributions to the literature suggest two
explanations: first, that debt provides private equity firms with an
advantage in bidding for target companies,172 and second, that the
standard allocation of profits between private equity firms and their
investors creates incentives for private equity firms to maximize their
portfolio companies’ leverage.173 Thus, when a private equity fund
acquires a company, it causes the company to incur debt on the order
of 50-80% of total enterprise value and will seek to maintain as high
a level of debt as possible throughout its term of ownership.174 In
contrast to typical companies, private equity-sponsored companies
borrow as much as the market will allow, and they borrow
independently of their operational need for debt.175 In contrast, public
companies (for example) tend to borrow relatively little and
primarily for operational reasons.176
taxes, depreciation, and amortization” for a sample of LBOs and public
companies).
172
See generally Bartlett, supra note 52. Note that this explanation does not
account for the well-documented fact that private equity-owned companies
deliberately maintain very high leverage ratios following their initial
acquisition.
173
Ulf Axelson, Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, Why Are Buyouts
Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds, 64 J. FIN. 1549,
1555 (2009).
174
Id.
175
Id.; Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 171, at 4.
The latter demonstrates that the amount of leverage in private equity-owned
companies is completely unrelated to that in comparable public companies,
and that such leverage is chosen for entirely different reasons. The authors
describe the pattern of leverage in LBO portfolio companies and public
companies as the inverse of one another. Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg &
Weisbach, supra note 171, at 4.
176
Operational reasons for borrowing include the need to even out the cash
flows of a highly seasonal business or to make a planned acquisition. Public
companies borrow comparatively little for a variety of reasons. First, they
are subject to the well-recognized agency problem that management has
incentives to avoid the excessive monitoring and control by creditors that is
traditionally thought to accompany corporate loans. Jensen, supra note 75,
at 323–25. One manifestation of this is public company management’s
preference for having excess free cash on hand for self-interested reasons,
as opposed to operating leanly as high leverage would require. Id. Second,
risk-averse managers should be reluctant to incur debt: as leverage
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Second, the volume of borrowing is tipped even further
toward private equity when one compares a given private equity firm
to a given standalone company. A private equity firm often manages
several funds at once, each of which owns several portfolio
companies.177 Aggregating all of the borrowing of a given private
equity firm’s portfolio companies, it becomes clear that a private
equity firm will be active in the debt markets more frequently and for
greater amounts than would the management of a single company
comparable in size to one of the private equity firm’s portfolio
companies. Thus, the sheer volume of borrowing by private equity
firms makes it appropriate to view them as being involved in
repeated game with creditors in the debt markets.
A concrete example may help to illustrate the disparity in
borrowing size and frequency between a standalone company and a
private equity firm. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (“KKR”),
the largest private equity firm in the world, led the leveraged
acquisition of Del Monte Corporation on March 8, 2011.178 Until it
was acquired by KKR, Del Monte had been operating as a public
company since February 1999.179 Using datasets from Thomson
Reuters LPC’s DealScan database, Table 1 below compares the U.S.
syndicated loan transactions completed by Del Monte during its time
as a standalone, publicly traded corporation to those completed by
KKR on behalf of its various portfolio companies during the same
period. While Del Monte completed only six syndicated loan deals
during the relevant twelve-year period for a total of $6.1 billion,

increases, so does the company’s risk of insolvency, and thus the risk that
managers might lose their jobs. Id. Lastly, my own view is that public
companies may also simply grow out of their debt. If a company performs
well, its EBITDA increases, and its leverage ratio therefore decreases
naturally unless new debt is incurred. Yet, unlike a private equity-sponsored
company, a public company is less likely to incur additional debt in that
case because it does not face the same constant pressure to maximize
leverage (discussed above) as private equity firms do.
177
Harry Cendrowski & Adam A. Wadecki, Introduction to Private Equity,
in PRIVATE EQUITY HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 3, 6–8 (2d
ed. 2012).
178
Del Monte Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (June 15,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1259045/
000119312511189323/d10k.htm [hereinafter Del Monte 10-K].
179
Our History, DEL MONTE FOODS, http://www.delmontefoods.com/
company/default.aspx?page=oc_ourhistory (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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KKR completed ninety-eight for a total of $176.2 billion.180
Table 1. Borrowing Comparison: KKR vs. Del Monte (Pre-LBO)
U.S. syndicated loan deals completed between February 1999 and
March 2011 by Del Monte Corporation and by all KKR portfolio
companies.
# of Deals

Aggregate Size

Del Monte Corp.

6

$ 6.1 billion

KKR

98

$ 176.2 billion

2.

Effect on Incentives
a.

Reputation with Creditors
Generally

As repeat players in the debt markets, private equity firms
have the reputational incentive to act as gatekeepers.181 As we have
seen, the ability to borrow massive amounts of debt on good terms is
the sine qua non of private equity. Because they are constantly
seeking to obtain or refinance debt for one of their various portfolio
companies, private equity firms have much to gain from dealing with
creditors in good faith, and much to lose otherwise.182 Creditors have
180

DealScan Report, THOMSON REUTERS LPC, https://www.loanpricing.
com/products/solutions-for-the-primary-market/loanconnectordealscan/
(datasets on file with author). The case of Del Monte also illustrates the
separate point that individual companies tend to take on substantially more
debt once they are acquired by private equity firms. According to SEC
filings, Del Monte’s aggregate debt load increased from $1.26 billion to
$3.97 billion in connection with its 2011 acquisition by KKR. Del Monte
10-K, supra note 178, at 57.
181
Rongbing Huang, Jay R. Ritter & Donghang Zhang, Private Equity
Firms’ Reputational Concerns and the Costs of Debt Financing 3 (Oct. 24,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205720.
182
Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns
Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors, 66 MOD. L. REV.
665, 667 (2003).
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the opportunity to observe the track record of a private equity firm’s
portfolio companies over time, which will affect the debt terms that
the firm is able to negotiate for its companies in the future.183 Thus,
private equity firms have strong incentives to ensure good borrowing
behavior by their portfolio companies and thereby establish and
maintain good reputations with creditors.184
In this regard, private equity firms’ incentives diverge
enough from those of the managers of their portfolio companies that
they will behave differently toward creditors than management
would at least some of the time. It is undeniable that a private equity
firm, as the sole shareholder of its portfolio companies, would
benefit in the short-term from any gains derived from
misrepresentations or misconduct by one of its portfolio companies
with respect to its creditors.185 Under normal circumstances,186
however, the long-term harm to the firm’s reputation from such
misconduct should outweigh the short-term benefit. This divergence
between private equity firms’ and management’s incentives enables

183

Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2464–67.
This is not to say that examples of private equity errors in judgment or
“misbehavior” towards lenders do not exist. For example, some dividendrecapitalization transactions initiated by private equity sponsors (in which
the portfolio company borrows additional debt for the sole purpose of
issuing a dividend to the private equity fund that owns it) have left portfolio
companies with too little equity cushion, which eventually led to
insolvency. A notable example is the 2004 bankruptcy of KB Toys, which
occurred only twenty months after Bain Capital caused it to undergo a
dividend-recapitalization. Bain Capital Buys Toys Unit of Consolidated
Stores, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at C3; Nicholas Confessore, Christopher
Drew & Julie Creswell, Buyout Profits Keep Flowing to Romney, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at A1. Such missteps undoubtedly had a negative
impact on the relevant private equity firms’ ability to negotiate financing on
good terms, at least in the short run. Conversely, private equity funds have
on occasion contributed additional equity to their portfolio companies in
order to avert or cure a default on their debt; information about such
occurrences is rarely publicly available, but recent work demonstrates that
private equity firms are more likely to do this than other owners when the
company is in bankruptcy proceedings. Hotchkiss et al., supra note 54, at
23–24.
185
See Davis, supra note 9, at 89 (suggesting that the “strip and flip” private
equity trend is evidence that “despite the ability of private-equity sponsors
to take a long-term view, they will not always do so”).
186
See infra Part V for limitations on private equity’s gatekeeping role.
184
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private equity firms to serve as effective gatekeepers.187 Concern for
their long-term reputation should thus cause private equity firms to
exert efforts to mitigate the agency costs of debt in their portfolio
companies.
In game-theory terms, private equity firms should behave
quite differently in repeated game with creditors than in an end
game.188 Appendix A hereto provides a theoretical model
demonstrating this result, and the following simple numerical
example illustrates the point. Assume that a private equity fund uses
$20 million of its own pooled cash to acquire a company, and that
creditors lend an additional $80 million, such that the enterprise
value of the company is $100 million at the outset. Assume next that
due to an exogenous shock, the value of the company immediately
declines to $80 million. At this juncture, the company is exactly on
the border of insolvency, having just enough to repay the creditors
(assuming no interest or fees have accrued, for simplicity).
The company can now be viewed as having only two
options. The first, Option A, is simply to use the remaining $80
million to repay the creditors in full. The second, Option B, is to take
on a risky project on the slim chance that it will turn things around
for the company. Assume, for example, that the project has a 10%
chance of increasing the company’s value to $500 million, and a
90% chance of decreasing the company’s value to $0. Option A is
great for creditors, who get all of their money back, but bad for the
private equity firm, which will lose its entire investment in the
company. Option B, on the other hand, is disastrous for both
creditors and the company itself, because the expected value of the
firm is only $50 million. From the private equity firm’s perspective,
however, Option B is actually more appealing than Option A; even
though the most likely outcome is that the company’s value will be
entirely wiped out, there is still some possibility that the private
equity firm will recover its investment and, in fact, profit from it.
In an end-game situation, then, the private equity firm would
unquestionably pick the “bet-the-farm” Option B, even though it
would leave creditors with nothing. However, in a repeated game,
the private equity firm will have at least some incentive to select
187

See Coffee, supra note 99, at 309 (highlighting the importance of
differing incentives between the gatekeeper and the companies it serves).
188
See generally Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The
Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 381 (2005)
(analyzing incentives for managers in repeat game and end game scenarios).
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Option A. Even though the private equity firm loses everything—
with certainty—under Option A, by repaying creditors in full, it will
preserve its reputation in the debt markets and thus its ability to
borrow on good terms in future deals.
In sum, private equity firms can be characterized as repeat
players in the debt markets, while standalone companies more
closely resemble end-game players.189 As shown in the previous
example and in Appendix A, this should have a material impact on
the respective debt terms that private equity firms are able to
negotiate with creditors.
b.

Reputation with Specific
Creditors

The previous section demonstrated how a private equity
firm’s reputation among creditors as a whole serves to mitigate the
agency costs of debt and leads to more favorable debt terms for its
portfolio companies. Yet private equity firms are repeat players not
only with respect to creditors in general, but more importantly with
respect to a small group of specifically identifiable creditors: the
handful of major U.S. commercial and investment banks that
specialize in arranging or underwriting leveraged loans.190
The incentive not to cheat is much stronger when a private
equity firm deals with the same creditor (the “relationship bank”)
over and over again than when it deals with a different creditor each
time, because the relationship bank should always know when the
private equity firm has cheated it and immediately punish the private
equity firm the next time it attempts to borrow. When different
creditors are involved each time, however, the incentive not to cheat
will depend on whether anyone other than the borrower and creditor

189

Of course, the dichotomy between the two groups is not nearly so stark
in practice. The most seasoned corporate issuers borrow fairly regularly,
giving them at least some reputational stakes as well. The more accurate
depiction is of a scale of reputational incentives, with the most established
private equity firms lying at one end, start-up companies and insolvent
companies on the other, and large-cap standalone corporate issuers that are
frequent borrowers somewhere in the middle.
190
The U.S. market for lead arranger positions is highly concentrated,
dominated by the largest investment and commercial banks. Shivdasani &
Wang, supra note 152, at 1306.
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at issue can discern whether cheating has occurred191 and, if so, how
quickly that information is disseminated to other creditors.192 Thus,
by virtue of their relationships with a very small set of specific
banks, private equity firms have an even stronger incentive to
maintain reputations for good borrowing behavior, and creditors
have more reason to rely on such reputations.193
Table 2 below illustrates the importance of private equity
firms’ relationships with specific banks. It lists the aggregate number
and amount of credit facilities negotiated by KKR with the largest
U.S. banks.194 The data was compiled using Thomson Reuters LPC’s
191

In the gatekeeper context, Frank Partnoy makes a similar point when
noting that the reputation market is not efficient because it is difficult to
observe the reputational intermediaries’ effort and to correctly link it to
companies’ performance. Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A
Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 366–67 (2004).
192
A more precise illustration follows. Imagine that a private equity firm
expects to borrow at times T1 and T2, and that the group of potential
creditors includes A, B, C, etc. Assume the private equity firm borrows
from A at T1. If it is likely to borrow from A again at T2, it will have a very
strong incentive not to cheat A at T1 because A is highly likely to know that
it has been cheated and to retaliate by offering worse loan terms (such as a
higher interest rate) at T2. If, however, the private equity firm is equally
likely to borrow from a different creditor at T2, its incentive not to cheat at
T1 will be weaker because (1) the information concerning the private equity
firm’s actions at T1 may not have reached the other creditors by T2 and (2),
even if it has, these creditors may not know with certainty whether such
actions amounted to cheating by the private equity firm. (For example, if
the private equity firm’s portfolio company defaulted on its debt between T1
and T2, the creditors may not be able to discern whether this was a result of
misconduct by the private equity firm or of some event outside of the
private equity firm’s control). Thus, repeat interactions with the very same
lender make it even less likely that the private equity firm will cheat.
193
For a rare example in the corporate law literature noting the reputational
advantages of private equity, see Whitehead, supra note 15, at 666–67
(explaining that “[t]he private equity market is principally comprised of a
limited group of participants that interact frequently, suggesting that a
reputation as a ‘good’ borrower can have substantial and positive economic
consequences”). For an empirical demonstration of the effect of repeated
interactions between the borrower and the same lender, see generally
Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13.
194
Note that Table 2 covers only senior loans; if high-yield bonds were
included the number of transactions with each bank group and aggregate
amount would be significantly higher.
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DealScan database of syndicated loans.195
Table 2. KKR Bank Relationships: 1986-2011
Most frequent lead (or co-lead) arrangers for bank debt facilities of
KKR-sponsored companies from March 1, 1986 through May 30,
2011. Includes only facilities denominated in U.S. dollars and
syndicated in the U.S.
Lender Group
JP Morgan
Deutsche Bank
Citibank
Bank of America
Credit Suisse
Goldman Sachs

Facilities for KKROwned Companies
154
141
98
86
68
56

Total Amount
$104,723,000,000
$86,223,298,224
$96,324,487,889
$50,909,835,183
$67,377,466,643
$64,312,858,906

Between 1986 and 2011, KKR-sponsored companies entered
into at least 154 credit facilities in which JP Morgan was the lead or
co-lead arranger, for a total of nearly $105 billion.196 It is thus easy to
understand why KKR’s historic track record with JP Morgan affects
the loan terms that KKR is able to obtain from JP Morgan in future
deals, and provides strong incentives for KKR to ensure that JP
Morgan is happy with the credit performance of KKR’s portfolio
companies.197
195

DealScan Report, THOMSON REUTERS LPC, https://www.loanpricing.
com/products/solutions-for-the-primary-market/loanconnectordealscan/
(datasets on file with author).
196
Id.
197
The literature on relationship banking is extensive, and focuses on the
fact that repeat interactions between the same borrower and lender reduce
information asymmetries between them, thereby allowing for better loan
terms (or even for loans to be made in the first place). E.g., Sreedhar T.
Bharath, Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders & Anand Srinivasan, Lending
Relationships and Loan Contract Terms, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1141, 1141–42
(2011). What is important to remember is that private equity firms are not
themselves borrowers, and that (roughly speaking), we can think of each
borrowing that a private equity firm negotiates as being for a totally
different company. Thus, the traditional benefits for the lender from repeat
lending (increasing familiarity with the company’s operations, management,
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Private Equity Firms’ Ability to Mitigate Agency
Costs

In order to act as gatekeepers, it is not sufficient that private
equity firms have the incentive to mitigate agency costs; they must,
of course, also have the ability to do so. Private equity firms satisfy
this third gatekeeping requirement in that they are able to mitigate
(though not eliminate) adverse selection and moral hazard problems
with respect to their portfolio companies.
1.

Adverse Selection

To keep things simple, imagine that a company approaches a
single creditor and asks for a loan at the creditor’s going rate for
similar loans to companies in that industry and market. From the
creditor’s perspective, the problem of adverse selection is perhaps
better described as three problems: (1) the statistical likelihood that
the borrower is of “low” quality in the absence of any knowledge
about its individual characteristics (which is determined by the
percentage of low-quality companies among all those that approach
the creditor to borrow funds); (2) the difficulty of determining the
borrower’s actual quality, assuming a perfectly trustworthy borrower
(which is determined by factors such as the quality of the borrower’s
financial information, the ability to make accurate projections based
on such information, and the ability to glean intangible features of
the company, etc.); and (3) the possibility that the borrower might
not be trustworthy, that is, that it might affirmatively misrepresent its
quality to the creditor. Private equity firms have the ability to
ameliorate each of these three facets of borrower adverse selection.
With respect to the first problem, private equity firms may
increase the baseline probability that the borrower is of high quality
through their skill in picking companies to acquire. Because they are
in the business of making frequent acquisitions, it is at least plausible
that they develop over time an expertise in identifying higher-quality
companies.198 And if private equity firms are able to bring higheretc.) simply do not apply here. Instead, what makes the difference here is
the gatekeeping role played by the private equity firm.
198
Just how plausible this advantage in picking companies is depends on
how we define “higher-quality” or “better” companies. One possibility is
that the company has been undervalued by the market (e.g., its growth rate
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quality companies to creditors in the first place, creditors will reward
them with better debt terms.199 Thus, the private equity borrowing
advantage may owe in part to private equity firms’ reputations for
picking better companies ex ante. If so, private equity firms perform
not only the traditional, passive certification role of gatekeepers, but
also an active selection or filtering role as well.
This role also explains how private equity firms can
minimize the second problem for creditors: the difficulty of
determining a given borrower’s quality. In order to pick better
companies, private equity firms must first accurately pinpoint a
company’s quality. Prior to making an acquisition, a private equity
firm gleans significant information about the company through its
extensive due diligence efforts (such as meeting repeatedly with
management and engaging top-tier auditors and law firms to conduct
due diligence).200 As the intended sole owner of the target, the
private equity firm’s stakes are higher than creditors’ in determining
the target’s quality. Post-acquisition, the private equity firm controls
the company and has direct access to all company information.201
Together these should translate into an ability to gauge the value of a
company that is superior to one based solely on the information that
borrowers provide to creditors.202
will be higher than what its share price currently reflects). The second is
that the company has a superior ability to bear a heavy debt load (e.g., it
will generate a large, predictable cash-flow, with minimal volatility).
Private equity firms are far more likely to have an advantage over the rest of
the market under the second definition, which incidentally is the measure of
quality that creditors are far more concerned about. Because private equity
acquisitions require a very high proportion of debt financing, private equity
firms—unlike most acquirers—are almost exclusively focused on
companies’ ability to generate cash. Harry Cendrowski & Adam A.
Wadecki, Private Equity Governance Model, in PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY,
GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS, 163, 170 (2d ed. 2012). This is why
private equity valuations are always expressed as a multiple of EBITDA. It
is less likely, however, that private equity firms could have an advantage in
identifying undervalued companies, particularly in the large-cap area, where
companies are typically auctioned off to several bidders in a highly
competitive process. Bartlett, supra note 52, at 2016, 2018.
199
Whitehead, supra note 15, at 665–66.
200
Spindler, supra note 133, at 325.
201
Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 223–24.
202
Of course, private equity’s advantage in this regard should be inversely
related to the availability of information about the companies at issue. The
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Finally, private equity firms are able to prevent the third type
of adverse selection: actual misrepresentations to creditors. As sole
shareholders of their portfolio companies, private equity firms have
direct control of management and, for the reasons discussed above,
will be able to recognize when management is misrepresenting
information.203
2.

Moral Hazard

The ability to mitigate moral hazard in their portfolio
companies is one of the key benefits of private equity firms’ status as
“insider” gatekeepers: they can limit misconduct by management
because, unlike creditors, they have direct and continuous control
over the borrower.204 As sole shareholders, they are able to prevent
management from taking actions that harm the company’s creditors,
just as they are able to prevent management from misrepresenting
the company’s quality.
Private equity firms have an additional and highly valuable
advantage over most borrowers in controlling moral hazard. If,
despite best intentions, its portfolio company has defaulted—or is at
risk of defaulting—on its debt, a private equity firm can put
more information about a company is available to the public, the less likely
it is that private equity firms will find things that others have not. Thus,
private equity’s role in mitigating adverse selection may well be greater for
smaller, private companies (in the middle-market or lower-middle market)
than for large public companies.
203
Davis, supra note 9, at 85.
204
Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 251. However, that is not to say
that creditors do not have any control over their borrowers. There is a wellestablished literature demonstrating that creditors impact their borrowers’
corporate governance because they are able to exercise some measure of
control over them. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 1209 (2005–2006) (criticizing traditional approaches to corporate
governance that ignore the large and growing role of creditors); George G.
Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995) (offering an alternative theory of
corporate governance that encompasses the interactions occurring between
stakeholders and managers); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room:
The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57
UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009) (arguing that “private lender influence
significantly constrains managerial discretion”).
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additional equity into the borrower to avoid or remedy the default.205
The latter option simply is not feasible for the shareholders of a
public company, for example, yet it is a major benefit from a
creditor’s perspective in reducing moral hazard concerns.
In order to appreciate the value of private equity’s role in
mitigating the agency costs of debt, recall that private equity-backed
companies are far more leveraged than their standalone company
counterparts.206 The greater a company’s leverage, the more severe
its potential for both adverse selection and moral hazard.207 Adverse
selection is exacerbated because higher-leveraged companies pay
higher interest rates to compensate lenders for the additional risk of
default.208 Higher interest rates in turn attract lower-quality
borrowers (who have less to lose than higher-quality borrowers).209
Moral hazard is exacerbated because shareholders’ returns from
taking actions that divert wealth from the company’s creditors are
increased when they have less of their own money at stake.210 All
else being equal, therefore, a company with greater leverage imposes
greater agency costs on lenders. Private equity firms’ ability and
incentives to mitigate these costs should therefore contribute to a
material borrowing advantage in the market.
IV.

Measuring Private Equity’s Gatekeeping Performance

The previous Part III and Appendix A demonstrate
conceptually why private equity firms should be expected to act as
gatekeepers in the debt markets. This Part IV examines what can
(and cannot) be said about whether this is true in practice. Part A
summarizes the limited, indirect empirical evidence currently
available to support the claims of this Article and discusses the
difficulties that preclude direct empirical support. Part B briefly
advances three additional hypotheses—unrelated to the gatekeeper
effect—for why private equity-owned companies might have a
borrowing advantage over standalone companies.

205

Hotchkiss et al., supra note 54, at 23–24.
Davis, supra note 9, at 91.
207
For a formal proof, see infra Appendix A, Section 1.
208
See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 45; Davis, supra note 9, at 91.
209
Choi & Triantis, supra note 118, at 55–56.
210
Smith & Warner, supra note 134, at 118–19.
206
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Evidence

Part II of this Article advanced two claims: first, driven by
their reputational incentives, private equity firms act as gatekeepers
in the debt markets; and second, a private equity-backed company
should obtain more favorable debt terms than a non-sponsored
company, all else being equal. In order to conclude that private
equity firms act as gatekeepers, then, we would want evidence first,
that private equity-sponsored companies get better debt terms, ceteris
paribus, and, second, that reputation is the cause of this borrowing
advantage. The available evidence (and lacunae) for each are
discussed in turn below.
1.

Better Loan Terms for Private Equity?

Practitioners and the financial press take it as a given that
private equity firms obtain debt terms for their portfolio companies
that others simply cannot match.211 Determining whether private
equity-owned companies get better loan terms than comparable
standalone companies would thus seem to be a relatively
straightforward matter. In practice, however, direct empirical
evidence is elusive because loans to private equity-backed and
standalone companies cannot be sufficiently matched. There is too
little overlap in the borrowing amounts212 and types213 of highly211

See, e.g., Matthew Benjamin, Deal Mania, Shades of the ‘80s: The
Leveraged Buyout Is Back in Vogue, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 18,
2005, at 40; Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Money Binge: What Lies Behind All
the Cash Driving the Record Run of Buyouts?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at
H1 (describing how the willingness of banks to “lend huge sums on friendly
terms” has contributed to the increase in buyouts).
212
See generally Bartlett, supra note 52. Highly-leveraged public
companies do of course exist, but they tend to cluster in very specific
industries, such as airlines and cable companies, or are highly leveraged not
by design, but as a result of deteriorating performance (so-called “fallen
angels”). See Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 171,
at 32.
213
Private equity-backed companies are primarily financed with “bank
debt.” Public companies, for example, often opt for a different mix of debt
financing types. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 141. The largest
public companies will often issue commercial paper (for very short-term
borrowing) and public bonds (for long-term borrowing), in lieu of bank
debt. Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 775, 780

2013-2014

PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AS GATEKEEPERS

163

leveraged private equity-backed companies and their less-leveraged
standalone counterparts.214 Simply put, the assumptions underlying
the “all else being equal” proviso are not satisfied.215
Paradoxically, however, the lack of data to support a direct
empirical proof of the claim could be taken as evidence in favor of
(2011). What bank debt they do employ is used for the purpose of providing
back-up liquidity, and is therefore generally in the form of an undrawn
revolving credit facility, rather than the term loan favored by LBO
companies. Amir Sufi, Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An
Empirical Analysis, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1057, 1067 (2009).
214
One would expect the ideal test to be a comparison of the debt terms of a
given company immediately prior to, and after, its acquisition by a private
equity fund. Yet in virtually all instances, leveraged buyouts involve a
major increase in the target company’s leverage, which of course affects the
terms of the debt independently of the company’s ownership. See Bartlett,
supra note 52, at 2014–16.
215
The most obvious problematic assumption is that of identical leverage
between private equity-backed companies and standalone companies, as
discussed in the previous notes. A second assumption that proves
problematic is that the private equity-owned company and the standalone
company have the same amount of information available to creditors. Thus,
a potential rebuttal to the claim would be that, at least for public companies,
the void in monitoring is partially addressed by the greater availability of
information about the borrower. Public companies are required to disclose
material information publicly (and promptly), whereas private company
information is less readily available. Healy & Palepu, supra note 127, at
411–12. Even assuming that the information required to be disclosed by
public companies is especially useful for monitoring loan performance, the
information gap between private equity-backed companies and public
companies is decreasing, particularly with respect to the largest LBO
portfolio companies. First, many of these companies issue not only bank
debt, but also publicly-traded bonds, and therefore, subject themselves to
the same reporting rules as public companies. Bartlett, supra note 88, at 15.
Second, lenders generally impose financial and other reporting obligations
in the credit agreement that are designed to approximate public company
reporting, particularly with large borrowers. RICHARD WIGHT, WARREN
COOKE & RICHARD GRAY, THE LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT
GUIDE 310–18 (2009). Third, the growth of syndication has been
accompanied by the introduction of loan ratings by the major national rating
agencies and detailed reporting on loan market in trade journals and the
general financial media, all of which have narrowed the information gap
between loans to private and public companies. STANDARD & POOR’S, A
GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 11 (2011), available at https://www.
lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf.
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the claim. The paucity of highly-leveraged loans to standalone
companies suggests that there is little appetite by lenders to provide
so much leverage and on such favorable terms to such companies—
the market simply does not support it.216 Consistent with the
gatekeeper hypothesis, private equity firms enable companies to do
something that—due to the excessive agency costs—they otherwise
could not: borrow massive amounts of debt on highly favorable
terms.217
Time-series data fare somewhat better than cross-sectional
data in pointing at a private equity borrowing advantage.218 Over
recent periods, for example, the evolution in debt terms seems to
have been relatively more favorable to private equity-backed
companies than to other companies.219 During the same 2004 to 2007
period during which private equity acquisitions surged, creditors’
lending standards loosened dramatically; that is, debt terms improved
for all borrowers.220 Yet the leveraged loan segment of the market,
which is dominated by private equity-related borrowing, benefited
disproportionately.221
2.

What’s Reputation Got to Do with It?

Even assuming a private equity borrowing advantage, there
is still the matter of determining the extent to which it is due to
216

Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2495 (acknowledging the lack of a
true comparison set for loans issued by private equity-owned companies).
217
Id. (explaining that “LBO firms’ repeated interactions with banks create
opportunities to reduce the costs associated with information
asymmetries”). In fairness, however, this does not rule out the alternative
explanation that standalone companies simply do not want to take on as
much debt as private equity-owned companies. The debate over the optimal
capital structure for companies is still largely unresolved. See Bartlett,
supra note 52, at 1985–91.
218
Demiroglu & James, supra note 165, at 308–09, 315.
219
E.g., Christenfeld & Goodstein, supra note 163; Foley, supra note 163,
at 12.
220
Demiroglu & James, supra note 165, at 308 (“[S]ignificant declines,
after 2002, in the proportion of traditional bank loans and the number and
tightness of financial covenants associated with leveraged loans . . . suggest
a decline in the intensity and importance of bank monitoring.”).
221
Id. at 315 (explaining that “the decline in importance of covenants in
loans to private equity firms only partly reflects an overall trend in credit
market conditions”).
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private equity firms’ reputation for mitigating agency costs.222
Happily, recent empirical finance work demonstrates that private
equity firm reputation positively affects the terms on which portfolio
companies are able to borrow.223
First, Cem Demiroglu and Christopher James find that more
established private equity firms obtain better financing terms for
their portfolio companies than less well-established ones.224 Their
findings hold under various measures of firm reputation (years in
operation, assets under management, etc.).225 Because private equity
firms are not liable for their portfolio companies’ debts, the result
that private equity sponsors’ reputation impacts their portfolio
companies’ financing terms is surprising. The explanation offered
here, of course, is that creditors reward private equity firms for their
efforts at mitigating adverse selection and moral hazard in their
portfolio companies.
Second, Victoria Ivashina and Anna Kovner find that the
more a private equity firm interacts with the same lead arranger, the
better its portfolio companies’ debt terms will be.226 In our terms,
private equity-backed companies obtain better debt terms when they
are in repeated games with creditors than in end games.227 Granted,
the effect on debt terms from such repeated interactions could also be
due to private benefits that they afford the lead arranger (such as
cross-selling opportunities),228 yet the authors find that the effect
remains even after accounting for such benefits.229 Thus, the
empirical results support the hypothesis that private equity firms’
reputations with lenders provide an advantage in debt terms.

222

A helpful test would be the comparison of management buyouts (MBOs)
to leveraged buyouts (LBOs) because the former are akin to end-game
financings, while the latter are repeated games. Thus, one would expect
MBOs to obtain worse debt terms than LBOs. While anecdotal evidence
suggests that this is indeed the case, the data on MBOs is insufficient for
empirical testing of the claim.
223
See generally Demiroglu & James, supra note 165; Ivashina & Kovner,
supra note 13.
224
Demiroglu & James, supra note 165, at 329.
225
Id. at 316–17.
226
Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2495.
227
Id. at 2480, 2495.
228
See infra Part V.B.2.
229
Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2487.

166

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

B.

Vol. 33

Additional Hypotheses for Private Equity
Borrowing Advantage

One of the difficulties in isolating and measuring the effect
of a private equity firm’s reputation on its portfolio companies’
financing terms is that additional plausible hypotheses exist to
explain why private equity-backed companies might have a
borrowing advantage over standalone companies. In addition to the
gatekeeper effect, the hypotheses include the following: (1) private
equity-related loans are more liquid; (2) private equity firms get a
volume discount from the major banks that arrange or underwrite
their debt; and (3) private equity firms have a bargaining advantage
in the debt markets.230
1.

Liquidity

If we loosen the assumptions and no longer hold leverage
constant, we find that private equity-owned companies borrow
substantially more than comparable standalone companies.231 This
affects private equity-owned borrowers’ debt terms in two opposing
ways. On the one hand, as discussed above, greater leverage gives
rise to greater agency costs, and thus to greater credit risk.232 Yet on
the other, the high leverage of private equity-related loans also
provides one major benefit to creditors over less-leveraged loans,
which is a lower liquidity risk.233 Contrary to all other U.S. capital
markets (including the stock and bond markets), the riskiest assets
are currently the most liquid in the corporate loan market.234
Specifically, “leveraged loans,”235 which are the type favored by
230

These hypotheses will be discussed in greater detail in a companion
piece to this Article.
231
See generally Bartlett, supra note 52.
232
Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and
Lending Relationships, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2835, 2836 (2009).
233
YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 35–41. Liquidity can be thought
of as the ease with which a loan can be sold to another lender.
234
Drucker & Puri, supra note 232, at 2835 (explaining that the secondary
loan market is unusual in that trading “is dominated by leveraged, risky
loans,” unlike the public debt markets).
235
“Leveraged loan” is the pleonastic term used to describe loans to highlyleveraged borrowers. The technical definition of a leveraged loan is a matter
of some debate, and is variously tied to loans with (1) interest rate margins
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private equity-owned companies, are more liquid than loans made to
borrowers with low leverage.236
The basic impetus for this surprising phenomenon is that
non-bank institutional lenders, which have rapidly taken the largest
share of the market, are best suited to invest in a type of leveraged
loan issued by private equity-firms (the eponymous “institutional”
tranches), while the more traditional loans of investment grade
borrowers are still funded almost exclusively by banks.237 With more
lenders clamoring to fund private equity-related loans, the latter have
become a highly liquid asset class, and are for this reason made on
relatively better terms.

above a certain threshold or (2) credit ratings below a certain threshold.
STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 215, at 29.
236
YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 35–41.
237
Id. at 18–22. The more technical explanation is as follows. Secondary
trading began with the originating banks, which, in response to new bank
capital requirements, sought ways to diversify their loan holdings and began
applying portfolio theory consistently beginning in the early 1990s.
STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 215, at 11. Changes to the mechanics of
loan transfers followed rapidly, allowing for more efficient and rapid
transfer and pricing of loans. YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 23–
24. These changes included the founding of a trade association for the
syndication and trading of loans (the LSTA), as well as the introduction of
mark-to-market loan pricing, loan ratings by the national rating agencies,
and standardized forms for the assignment of loans. Allison A. Taylor, The
LSTA and Its Role in the Promotion of the Corporate Loan Assets Class, in
THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 61–75 (Allison
Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2006). Thereafter, the watershed moment
was the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 144A, which, among other things,
allowed non-bank investors to begin trading syndicated loans. Thomas &
Wang, supra note 155, at 304–05. New classes of institutional lenders,
eventually including structured finance products such as CLOs, swarmed
into the market, with very different goals and constraints than traditional
banks. YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 19–22. The end result was a
vast new supply of lenders in the loan market, heavily tilted toward
leveraged loans. Id. at 25. While leveraged loans are heavily traded, it is
still the case that, overall, most syndicated loans are not traded on the
secondary market. Drucker & Puri, supra note 232, at 2853 (acknowledging
that only 20% of all syndicated loans are sold in the secondary market).
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Volume Discount

As repeat players in the debt and acquisition markets, private
equity firms get the benefit of a form of volume discount from the
large commercial and investment banks that syndicate and/or
underwrite their debt.238 Such banks covet relationships with private
equity firms, which provide them with both substantial transaction
fee income from the debt financings239 and also cross-selling
opportunities for more lucrative services, including securities
underwriting and mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) advisory
services.240 In return for this additional income, the lead banks will
provide private equity-owned companies with more favorable loan
terms.241
3.

Bargaining Advantage

Through their repeated interactions with creditors, private
equity firms become more sophisticated customers in the debt
markets than standalone companies, and should therefore command
more bargaining power than standalone companies in negotiating
debt terms.242 Sophistication translates here into a twofold bargaining
advantage of superior information and superior skill. First, private
equity firms have an informational advantage over less frequent
players in the debt markets as to what financing terms are currently
the “market” terms.243 Because most financings are not made public,
a standalone company will have far less knowledge of market terms
than a private equity firm that is constantly in the debt markets for
238

Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2462.
Viral V. Acharya, Julian Franks & Henri Servaes, Private Equity: Boom
and Bust?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44, 52 (2007).
240
Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2462, 2464.
241
Regarding the transaction fee income, it is worth noting that as the loan
syndication market exploded, the fee component of a lender’s return from a
loan has become relatively more important because (1) the lead arranger
might retain only a very small portion of the original loan and (2) the
portion retained by the lead arranger can be more easily diversified now.
Recent work finds that the lead arranger for LBO financing typically retains
only 5–10% of the loan. Id. at 2469.
242
Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 171, at 2. Note
that this assumes market power on both the borrower and lender sides of the
market.
243
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 140–41.
239
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one of its portfolio companies.244 Private equity firms can and do use
their market knowledge to negotiate for better debt terms.245 Second,
private equity firms should be expected to develop greater skill in
sourcing and negotiating large financings using resources such as
their extensive bank contacts and their experience with everchanging finance structures and terms. Such skill manifests itself
notably in the frequent innovations in debt terms that originate with
private equity-related financings.246
Thus, gatekeeping by private equity firms need not be the
sole explanation for their ability to obtain highly favorable loan
terms for their portfolio companies; further work is needed to
determine the relative importance of each explanation.
V.

Grading Private Equity’s Gatekeeping Performance
A.

Limitations on Private Equity’s Gatekeeping

While private equity firms can perform a valuable
gatekeeping role in the debt markets, they are not a perfect cure for
the conflicts between borrowers and lenders. Reputation mitigates,
but does not eliminate, agency costs in a market.247 Thus, we would
want to know not only how private equity firms are able to act as
gatekeepers (as discussed in Part III), but also the particular
conditions under which they are likely to be reliable or unreliable
gatekeepers. This sub-part identifies the major limitations on private
equity firms’ gatekeeping performance. Per the framework
244

See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 59 (explaining “[p]rivate
equity firms also rely heavily on confidential information to finalize bids
before the competition is aware a target company is up for sale”).
245
Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 171, at 2.
246
In the most recent wave of activity alone, private equity firms introduced
or expanded several highly innovative (and borrower-favorable) loan terms
and structures such as covenant-lite loans, equity cures, “yank-a-bank”
provisions, PIK toggle loans, second-lien loans, amend-and-extend rights,
partial refinancing rights, institutional tranches, accordion facilities, and so
forth. Demiroglu & James, supra note 165, at 307; STANDARD & POOR’S,
supra note 215, at 25–27; Wight, supra note 28, at 218, 387.
247
In the case of the prototypical gatekeeper, accounting firms, one need
only consider the epic corporate accounting scandals from the early 2000s
to be convinced that reputation is not a perfect panacea. See, e.g., John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2001–2002).
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introduced in Part II, they are divided into those that limit private
equity firms’ ability to act as gatekeepers and those that limit their
incentive to act as gatekeepers.
At the outset, however, it is worth recalling that reputational
harm is the sole incentive that prompts private equity firms to fulfill
their gatekeeping role.248 Other gatekeepers may be compelled to act
as such not only through market forces, but also by law.249 In
contrast, private equity firms are pure market-based gatekeepers.
Nor do private equity firms typically assume any contractual
liability to bond themselves to their gatekeeping role.250 Although
private equity firms negotiate their portfolio companies’ debt with
creditors, the resulting contractual relationship is exclusively
between each portfolio company and its creditors, with rare
exceptions.251 Private equity’s gatekeeping in the debt markets is
solely driven by reputation, which is subject to well-recognized
weaknesses in constraining company behavior.252
1.

Limitations on Private Equity’s
Gatekeeping Ability
a.

Within-firm Agency Costs:
Disloyal Agents

The first set of limitations on private equity firms’
gatekeeping are the agency costs within the gatekeeping firm itself.
The interests of individual employees, partners, or even divisions of
a firm (such as maximizing their compensation, prestige, etc.) may
diverge from the interest of the firm as a whole in preserving its
248

See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 239–40 (explaining why
private equity firms act to prevent reputational harm).
249
See Kraakman, supra note 97, at 54.
250
Private equity funds resist guaranteeing their portfolio companies’ debt
largely for tax reasons. Much, if not most, of the private equity investor
base is composed of tax-exempt organizations (such as pension funds or
university endowments) and foreign institutions, both of which would face
adverse tax consequences if the funds were to provide such guarantees. See
26 U.S.C. §§ 511, 163(j) (2006); APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 13.
251
Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2469 (explaining that private
equity firms are not liable for their portfolio companies’ debts other than to
the extent of their initial equity investment).
252
See generally Coffee, supra note 247.
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reputation.253 The largest U.S. accounting firms exemplify this
tension. Typically, the interests of the firm would best be served by
refusing to endorse unusually aggressive accounting by one of its
clients because the loss in future firm income from the resulting
reputational harm should outweigh the incremental income generated
by that particular client.254 Yet the individual audit partner serving
that client might be hard-pressed to say no to the client; his or her job
may well depend on the firm’s retaining that client.255
In the private equity context, a similar problem arises
because individual private equity professionals’ compensation is
more heavily-weighted toward the deals that they help negotiate and
close. One could imagine situations in which they were better off
misleading creditors so as to get a deal done on otherwise
unattainably good terms.
But this problem may be less severe with private equity
firms than with traditional gatekeepers. The relatively small size of
private equity firms256 compared to accounting firms, investment
banks, and rating agencies, has three positive implications. Unlike
the behemoths of the gatekeeping world, private equity firms should
be able to monitor their professionals more closely and perhaps more
readily convey to them the interests of the firm.257 Second, the
pronounced intra-firm departmental conflicts of interest that exist in
the larger gatekeeping organizations are unlikely to develop in
smaller private equity firms.258 Finally, individual private equity
professionals’ compensation will be more closely tied to the fortunes
of the firm as a whole than in a larger organization (since each will
tend to have a greater share of the overall profits), thereby ensuring

253

See id. at 1405 (“Despite the clear logic of the gatekeeper rationale,
experience over the 1990s suggests that professional gatekeepers do
acquiesce in managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputational losses
seem to dwarf the gains to be made from the individual client.”).
254
Coffee, supra note 99, at 310–11.
255
Id. at 316 (describing that analysts and auditors are “‘reputational
intermediaries,’ whose desire to be perceived as credible and objective may
often be subordinated to their desire to retain and please” clients).
256
Jensen, supra note 73, at 69–70.
257
Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 224.
258
A classic example is the case of securities analysts being pressured to
give misleading company reviews by the investment bankers within the
same firm. Coffee, supra note 99, at 315–18.
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that their incentives are more closely aligned.259
b.

Difficulties in Obtaining
Company Information

Private equity’s role in minimizing adverse selection
depends on its ability to obtain company information that is not
readily available to creditors.260 Ironically, when private equity is
experiencing a peak of activity, its information advantage is at its
weakest. During a hot acquisition market, sellers have greater
bargaining power relative to acquirers.261 This allows sellers to
substantially shorten the target’s auction timeline, to provide very
limited information about the target to bidders, and to limit bidders’
opportunity to perform their own due diligence (such as by meeting
with the company’s management).262
Under such conditions, a private equity firm may be less
successful at mitigating adverse selection for two reasons. First, it
will have gathered less information about the target company than it
would have under normal market conditions, and thus may not be
able to reliably certify its quality to creditors. Second, a hot
acquisition market is a more competitive one, in which private equity
firms are less likely to find undervalued companies; anything that
they identify as a diamond in the rough is likely to be a fake.
2.

Limitations on Private Equity’s
Gatekeeping Incentives
a.

Market Bubbles

During a market bubble, the value of a gatekeeper’s
reputational capital declines.263 Investors experience so much
pressure to invest that they disregard or give less weight to
259

Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 131; Masulis & Thomas, supra
note 71, at 227–28.
260
Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2466.
261
See Ivashina & Sun, supra note 135, at 506–07.
262
See Lisa Read Blanco & Jaron Brown, How to Auction Your Company
to a Private Equity Fund, EXECUTIVE COUNSEL, July/Aug. 2007, available
at http://www.kslaw.com/Library/publication/ExecCounsel_BlancoBrown.
pdf.
263
Coffee, supra note 247, at 1412; Coffee, supra note 99, at 310.

2013-2014

PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AS GATEKEEPERS

173

gatekeepers’ pronouncements.264 The result is increased
permissiveness by gatekeepers because the cost of being permissive
(reputational harm) has declined relative to the benefits.265
By most accounts, a bubble did indeed occur in the debt
markets during the 2005 to 2007 lead-up to the global financial
crisis.266 The market experienced a glut of capital267 from
institutional investors chasing high returns and engaged in herding
behavior,268 resulting in a surge in liquidity that coincided with the
most recent private equity boom. Yet while many feared a
devastating post-bubble wave of defaults by the highly-leveraged
private equity-backed companies, as of 2013, we have yet to witness
it.269 Nonetheless, it may still be the case that creditors were not
adequately compensated for the level of risk that they assumed
during the go-go-go period.270
b.

Rational Firm Decisions to
Sacrifice Reputation

Even assuming that all of a gatekeeper’s agents are perfectly
loyal, there are circumstances in which the gatekeeper firm itself
might still permit corporate misbehavior. A gatekeeper may
rationally decide to deplete its reputational capital if doing so would
maximize its expected profits.271 For example, an exogenous factor
264

See Coffee, supra note 99, at 329.
Id. at 324.
266
Acharya et al., supra note 239, at 45.
267
The pre-crisis glut of capital in the debt markets has been variously
attributed to Asian governmental surpluses, excess oil profits, and a surge in
pension, foundation, and private wealth. Id. (citing Edward I. Altman,
Global Debt Markets in 2007: New Paradigm or the Great Credit Bubble?,
19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 17, 17 (2007)).
268
E.g., Ivashina & Sun, supra note 135, at 502 (concluding that, contrary
to the predictions of an efficient market, the demand curve for syndicated
corporate loans is downward sloping, such that exogenous shifts in the
supply of capital to the market affect loan valuations).
269
Christenfeld & Goodstein, supra note 163 (stating that “default rates are
generally at their lowest in many years”); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note
8, at 129 (finding a lower default rate for their sample of private equityowned companies than for all U.S. corporate bond issuers from 1980–
2002).
270
Shivdasani & Wang, supra note 152, at 1324.
271
Partnoy, supra note 191, at 367.
265

174

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 33

may change the calculus for the gatekeeping firm in such a way that
permissiveness becomes the optimal strategy, notwithstanding the
long-term harm to the firm’s reputation. In the private equity context,
one can derive plausible scenarios to that effect without much
difficulty.
First, when private equity firms recognize that they are at the
end of a cycle of activity—for instance, because credit markets are
drying up or target companies are overvalued—they might conclude
that the benefit from misrepresentation or misconduct toward
creditors outweighs the harm to their reputation, since they cannot be
certain that they will survive until the next cycle of activity.
Second, a private equity firm that is in the process of
fundraising for its next fund may be particularly eager to quickly
close an acquisition with its existing fund, rationally sacrificing some
of its long-term reputation in exchange for a short-term boost in
publicity.272
Finally, we have the obvious point that private equity firms
with less well-established reputations are more likely to be
permissive. Upstart private equity firms have less reputational capital
with creditors (and thus less to lose from putting it at risk) and more
incentives to “bet the farm” in order to produce higher returns in the
short term.273

272

RASHIDA K. LA LANDE, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, PRIVATE
EQUITY STRATEGIES FOR EXITING A LEVERAGED BUYOUT 2 (2011),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
LaLande-PrivateEquityStrategiesforExitingaLeveragedBuyout.pdf. For a
different account of the relationship between the timeline of a private equity
fund and the likely outcome for creditors of its portfolio companies, see
Hotchkiss et al., supra note 54, at 20 (arguing that a given portfolio
company is less likely to default on its debt if the private equity fund was
raised recently, because the fund has more undrawn capital and thus more
ability to contribute additional equity to prevent a default).
273
Meuleman et al., supra note 167, at 625 (arguing that “[b]ecause young
PE companies have more incentives to prove themselves so as to establish a
reputation, they are likely to take on more risky investment projects with
higher potential outcomes”). Here again, the finding that more reputable
private equity firms get better debt terms is particularly helpful. Demiroglu
& James, supra note 165, at 306.
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Conflicts of Interest

Conflicts of interest are another well-recognized source of
gatekeeping lapses.274 In the private equity sphere, a serious conflict
of interest arises when a private equity firm is owned by a bank.275 In
such cases, the bank can both acquire a company through the private
equity fund and arrange and/or underwrite all of the company’s
debt.276 Such a combination of roles has negative systemic effects277
and, for our purposes, results in greater adverse selection and moral
hazard problems toward the ultimate creditors in the syndicate.
However, this conflict of interest should be precluded going forward
by the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), which drastically
limits the ability of U.S. banks to invest in or form private equity
funds.278
To conclude this sub-part, private equity firms face
important limitations on their gatekeeping abilities and incentives,
though they may fare better in this regard than larger, more
traditional gatekeepers. The lessons for private equity firms and
creditors are two-fold. First, private equity firms must pay close
attention to their compensation practices to ensure that individual
professionals are not incentivized to act against the firm’s interests
by cheating creditors. Second, private equity firms will be less
reliable gatekeepers during bubbles in both the M&A and debt
markets, though this warning is by definition unlikely to be heeded
by investors and creditors at the time.
What can be said at this stage is that private equity firms
should be expected to improve their portfolio companies’ behavior
towards creditors to some degree, which will vary by firm and over
274

An oft-cited example is the fact that the debt rating agencies are paid by
the companies that they are supposed to rate. E.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit
Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement,
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 152 (2009).
275
See Lily Fang, Victoria Ivashina & Josh Lerner, Combining Banking
with Private Equity Investing, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 2139, 2140 (2009).
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
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time. The next sub-part briefly examines how private equity firms
stack up against the other major gatekeepers in the debt markets: the
credit rating agencies.
B.

A Word on Credit Rating Agencies

The credit rating agencies are natural candidates for
gatekeeping in the debt markets. Their sole stated function is to
gauge the quality of debt instruments from the perspective of
creditors.279 The two largest credit rating agencies, Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s, each have over a century of experience rating
debt products.280 Presumably then, they have developed substantial
expertise in assessing a borrower’s credit risk,281 and the reliability of
their ratings is assured by their long-standing reputations.
In practice, however, the rating agencies suffer from
perennial problems that drastically limit the role of reputational
capital in explaining their performance.282 Key criticisms include that
rating agencies are highly concentrated, massive organizations283 that
are subject to severe conflicts of interest.284 Further, rating agencies
may not actually provide investors with new information on
borrowers’ creditworthiness, but instead merely react to information
279

Hunt, supra note 274, at 114–15; see generally STANDARD & POOR’S,
supra note 215.
280
Ratings Definitions, MOODY’S, https://www.moodys.com/ratingsprocess/Ratings-Definitions/002002 (last visited Nov. 22, 2013); About Us,
STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/about-sp/main/
en/us (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
281
For a broad description of the proprietary methodology by which
Standard & Poor’s rates corporate loans, see Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to
the Loan Market, supra note 215, at 32–35.
282
Hunt, supra note 274, at 113. But see Claire A. Hill, Regulating the
Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 59–62 (2004) (describing how
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s hold 80% of the market share and are
generally relied upon by firms); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of
Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26
(2002) (“Rating agencies are already motivated to provide accurate and
efficient ratings because their profitability is directly tied to reputation.
Historical data confirm that the reputational motivation is sufficient.”)
283
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 648–
49 (1999).
284
Hunt, supra note 274, at 113.
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that is already available to the market.285 Finally, and most
damningly, though rating agencies purport to provide credit ratings,
the bulk of their profits derive instead from selling regulatory
entitlements.286 U.S. financial regulations are increasingly tied to
credit ratings, leading market participants to push for higher ratings
for credit products regardless of their underlying credit risk.287 In this
story, companies, investors, and investment managers are all
complicit in the rating agencies’ practice of assigning artificially
high ratings; the market expects and encourages the rating agencies
to perform their gatekeeping role poorly.288 In hindsight, all of these
problems figured prominently in the disgraceful performance of the
rating agencies leading up to the global financial crisis.289
It is also worth noting that the credit rating agencies are
relative novices when it comes to corporate loans (which represent
the largest share of debt issued by private equity-owned companies),
as opposed to public bonds, having only begun rating the former in
1996.290 The demand for corporate loan ratings arose only recently,
when the loan market began to look more like the bond market in
285

Partnoy, supra note 283, at 621.
Id. at 623–24; Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are
Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY
PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 64 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds.,
2006).
287
Partnoy, supra note 286, at 75–76.
288
See id. As an example, imagine that you are the investment manager for
a large pension fund. For prudential reasons, SEC regulations require a
minimum percentage of the fund’s assets to be invested in cash or AAArated investments. Like any good investor, you know that low-risk assets
(such as AAA-rated ones are intended to be) provide low returns. Since
your compensation is based on achieving high returns for the pension fund
and doing so demands greater risk, you will be happiest under a regime in
which high-risk investments are falsely rated AAA.
289
See generally Complaint, United States v. McGraw-Hill Companies, No.
CV13-00779 (C.D.C.A. filed Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/849201325104924250796.PDF; Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Sues Standard &
Poor’s for Fraud in Rating Mortgage-Backed Securities in the Years
Leading up to the Financial Crisis (Feb. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-ag-156.html [hereinafter
DOJ Press Release] (alleging that Standard & Poor’s “issued inflated
ratings that misrepresented the securities’ true risks”).
290
Page & Swaffield, supra note 16, at 33.
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terms of liquidity and creditor dispersion.291
However, the spectacular pre-crisis failures of the rating
agencies were not related to their ratings of corporate bonds or
syndicated loans.292 Rather, the culprit was the ratings of the
structured finance products tied to other assets—including bonds and
loans.293 It is during this boom period that the practice of
securitization exploded.294 In order to provide investors with cheap
diversification and access to new asset classes, while keeping risky
assets off their own books, financial institutions pooled cashproducing assets (such as mortgages, credit card receivables, bonds,
and syndicated loans) and sold investors rights to them.295 The rating
agencies were called in to rate the securities issued by these
securitization vehicles, and the market quickly witnessed the oddity
of AAA ratings for securities tied to junk-rated assets.296 Coffee’s
“market bubble story”297 seems a particularly fitting explanation:
caught in the illusion of ever-increasing asset prices (in particular,
housing prices), investors ceased doing their own due diligence, and
the rating agencies succumbed to the allure of the seemingly endless
stream of fees generated by the securitization machine.298
While there is widespread agreement about the rating
agencies’ failures in the mortgage securitization realm, the jury is
still out on their performance in rating operating companies’ debt
and the securitization vehicles (such as CLOs and CBOs) that invest
in them.299 Even if credit rating agencies accurately rate the
291

Hill, supra note 282, at 53–54.
DOJ Press Release, supra note 289.
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2011).
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Rating Agencies Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 30 No. 12 BANKING & FIN.
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underlying company debt, if they are overly permissive in rating the
securitization vehicles that invest in them, which now represent over
60% of the leveraged loan market,300 it will result in over-lending to
borrowers or in lending on overly permissive terms.
With respect to the specific goal of minimizing borrower
agency costs, it would seem that the credit rating agencies can
perform, at best, only part of the task. Even assuming that they
provide perfectly accurate ratings, this amounts only to an ex ante
certification role, rather than an ex post monitoring role. The credit
rating agencies’ key performance is completed upfront, in rating the
debt at the time it is issued.301 While the rating agencies may
downgrade a particular debt instrument after it has been issued,
usually this will only be in response to information that is already
public and therefore already reflected in its price, if it is traded.302
More importantly, a downgrade is unlikely to effectively prevent
corporate misbehavior ex ante to the same extent that private equity
ownership would, all else being equal. It is true that issuers can be
“punished” by a downgrade (say, if it further reduces the trading
price of their debt), but two observations are in order.303 First,
downgrades are rare, reserved for borrowers with widely known
problems.304 Second, downgrades can only deter bad borrower
behavior ex ante if the borrower has strong reputational stakes in the
debt markets. And, as we have seen, this is less likely to be the case
with most borrowers than it is with private equity-owned borrowers.
Another way to see this is to consider that the rating agencies
suffer no reputational harm themselves when they downgrade a
borrower; the borrower’s misconduct after the loan has been issued
does not reflect poorly on the rating agencies, but only on the
borrower.305 In contrast, private equity firms are held responsible for
misbehavior by their portfolio companies, and suffer reputational
harm as a result.306 To conclude, even assuming that rating agencies
are helpful in mitigating borrower adverse selection, by certifying
300

Bobrow et al., supra note 152, at 166.
See Hill, supra note 282, at 48–50.
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Partnoy, supra note 283, at 661.
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See Hill, supra note 282, at 68 (“The very fact of a downgrade has an
effect; even if no information about the present financial situation is being
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Id. at 65–67.
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See id. at 68–70.
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borrowers’ quality ex ante, it is unclear whether rating agencies have
any significant effect in mitigating borrower moral hazard.
These existing (and widening) gaps in gatekeeping coverage
in the debt markets create an opportunity for private equity firms to
play a highly valuable role.307 The last piece of the puzzle is to
determine how regulators should respond.
C.

Regulatory Implications

Demonstrating that private equity adds value through
gatekeeping does not answer the question of whether private equity
increases social welfare overall: private equity has well-known costs
associated with it, and the task of weighing these against its benefits
is far from complete. Yet, it does disprove the common claim that
regulators could costlessly stamp out or curtail private equity.
Separately, the gatekeeper theory of private equity challenges
the wisdom of the recent regulatory push to make private equity firms
more accountable to their investors. Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
private equity firms are now, with very limited exceptions, required to
register as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.308 This change represents a fundamental shift in the regulation
and nature of private equity. The word “private” in private equity is no
accident: private equity firms have always been notoriously loath to
share detailed information about their investments and returns with
even their own investors, and have jealously guarded their status as
largely unregulated players.309
307

Frank Partnoy, among others, has proposed relying on credit default
swap (“CDS”) spreads as an alternative to the credit rating agencies. Mark
J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads
As Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2085
(2010). Because the return on a CDS is determined by the probability of a
given company defaulting on its debt, its price should reflect the market’s
view of the company’s creditworthiness at any given time. Id. at 2088. Yet
CDSs do not exist or are not heavily traded for most of the companies that
private equity funds might acquire, particularly the smaller, private
companies.
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Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 278, at §§ 401–416. The only private equity
firms exempt from the registration requirement are certain foreign
managers, small fund managers, and managers falling within the narrow
category of “venture capital fund” advisers. Id. §§ 403, 407.
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See Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law,
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As registered investment advisers, private equity firms will
join the ranks of advisers such as mutual fund managers that are well
accustomed to tight regulation and public scrutiny. In addition to
putting private equity squarely on the securities regulators’ radar
screen, this change is designed to make private equity firms more
accountable to their own investors.310 It imposes additional public
disclosure obligations and compliance requirements on private equity
firms, and subjects them to anti-fraud provisions, above and beyond
what investors in their funds may have contracted for.311 Most
significantly, registered investment advisers have non-waivable
fiduciary duties toward their investors312—duties which private
equity firms have heretofore deliberately avoided.313 Notably, these
changes did not come about at the behest of private equity investors.
Ironically, the result of making private equity firms more
accountable to their investors may well be lower returns for such
investors (in addition to increased borrowing costs for portfolio
companies), precisely because doing so hinders private equity firms’
ability to act as gatekeepers. To successfully perform their
gatekeeping function, private equity firms must have the leeway to
forego short-term profit opportunities at creditors’ expense for the
sake of maximizing long-term profit by maintaining a good
reputation with creditors.314 This privileging of long-term reputation
310

Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act
Amendments to Investment Advisers Act (June 22, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm.
311
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006).
312
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
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In the past, limited partnership agreements for private equity funds often
required investors (the limited partners) to waive the fiduciary duties of the
private equity firm (the general partner). William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd
Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in Private
Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 51–53 (2009). In Delaware, the jurisdiction
of choice for U.S. private equity limited partnerships, such as waiver is
expressly permitted by statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d)
(providing that the general partner’s fiduciary duties “may be expanded or
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement,” with
the exception of the contract-based duty of good faith and fair dealing). For
a history of this provision and its impact, see Birdthistle & Henderson,
supra.
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In other words, a key reason why private equity investors grant wide
latitude to private equity firms in their fund agreements is that this structure
maximizes long-term returns to investors. Axelson, Strömberg & Weisbach,
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maximizes returns for investors in private equity funds as a whole
and over time.315 The difficulty is that individual investors in private
equity funds do not have the same incentive as the private equity
firm itself to preserve the firm’s long-term reputation, primarily
because private equity funds have limited lifecycles.316
Take a given investor in a given private equity fund of a
given private equity firm, and assume that the fund will complete
only six acquisitions during its ten-year life span. Once the fund has
invested all of its pooled cash, the private equity firm will raise a
successor fund, and so on ad infinitum. (In addition, the private
equity firm manages several active funds at any given time, each
with a different investment focus.) Assume that the fund in question
is on the verge of making its final acquisition. At this point, unless it
has committed to invest in the successor fund, our investor will want
the private equity firm to defect from its long-term, optimal strategy
of behaving well towards creditors. The investor will want the
private equity firm to maximize short-term profits on the fund’s final
deal by extracting as much wealth as possible from creditors,
because it will bear none of the future harm from the private equity
firms’ loss of reputation.317 Having benefited from the private equity
firm’s reputational capital up until that point (through cheaper debt
for the fund’s acquisitions), the investor will now want the firm to
spend all of that capital on the final deal. Thus, if the private equity
firm, as a registered investment adviser, has a fiduciary obligation to
maximize profits for its investors in each fund and is required to
disclose all pertinent return calculations to investors, it may well be
forced into maximizing short-term profits at the expense of its longterm reputation and long-term profits.318
supra note 173, at 1549 (justifying the particular structure of private equity
funds as maximizing returns to limited partners (investors)). In essence, the
fund agreement is a self-binding mechanism for investors, preventing
individual opportunistic behavior that would harm the group.
315
Id.
316
Id. at 1574.
317
The private equity investor’s incentives are thus very different from
those of a public equity investor. Because public companies have infinite
lives and investment periods and their shares are liquid, the public company
shareholder should generally want to maximize the long-term value of the
company because it will determine today’s share price.
318
Of course, what fiduciary duties actually require in this example is
unclear. For an overview of the problem of fiduciary duty indeterminacy in
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Thus, making private equity firms more accountable to their
investors may well impede private equity firms’ gatekeeping
function, to the detriment of private equity investors as a whole.319
This, in turn, will undercut the gatekeeping benefits of a lower cost
of capital for portfolio companies and lower agency costs. In the
absence of material benefits to investors from having private equity
firms register as investment advisers, this policy choice seems
unwise.320
Conclusion
Private equity firms have evolved from “Barbarians at the
Gate” into keepers of the gate. By using their reputations to bridge
the information gap between companies and lenders, private equity
firms afford companies access to unprecedented levels of debt
financing, and on highly favorable terms. This novel conception of
private equity firms as gatekeepers suggests that their value lies at
least as much in their ability to broker cheap debt as in their muchtouted expertise with “turnarounds” and corporate governance. And
private equity firms will continue to be handsomely rewarded for
their gatekeeping services: with today’s increasingly complex and
dispersed corporate lending structures, reputable private equity firms
fill a gaping void left by a decline in lender monitoring and the
corporate law, see Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
319
The same is true of the very recent phenomenon of private equity firms
themselves “going public.” In an irony of both nomenclature and mission,
some of the very largest private equity firms in the world have recently
issued shares to the general public. Manesh, supra note 309, at 466–70
(describing prominent examples of private equity firms going public).
Though much has been made of the repercussions for corporate governance
(of both the private equity firm and its portfolio companies), the
repercussions for private equity’s borrowing advantage have been entirely
overlooked. By tethering private equity firms to short-term stock price
movements, public shareholders may lose the long-term value of private
equity firms’ ability to obtain favorable financing for portfolio companies.
320
In contrast, the gatekeeper theory of private equity does not entail any a
priori objections to other recent policy prescriptions affecting private
equity, including (1) the proposed elimination of the favorable tax treatment
for private equity professionals and (2) the Volcker Rule prohibition on
banks investing in or sponsoring private equity funds. See supra notes 66,
283–84 and accompanying text.
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failure of traditional debt-market gatekeepers. Demonstrating that
private equity creates value through gatekeeping dispels the
persistent myth of private equity as a mere wealth transfer. That
should change both our understanding of private equity and our
approach to regulating it.
Appendix A: Repeated-Game Model of Private Equity Borrowing
The model below demonstrates that private equity firms’
reputational stakes in the debt markets incentivize them to mitigate
agency costs in their portfolio companies, resulting in lower costs of
debt capital for private equity-owned companies as a whole.
Section 1 models the credit decision in an end-game between
a borrowing company and its lenders. It demonstrates that lenders
will demand higher interest rates to lend to companies with highly
leveraged capital structures (including private equity portfolio
companies), due to their increased agency costs.321 The initial setup
of the debt agency cost problem in Section 1 is a modification of the
basic credit-rationing model found in Tirole (2006).322
Section 2 extends the framework to show that a private
equity firm’s concern for its reputation in the debt markets—that is,
for its future payoffs in repeated iterations of the lending game—can
mitigate the debt agency problem. Specifically, it models the credit
decision in an indefinitely repeated game between a private equity
firm, negotiating debt financing for one of its portfolio companies,
and lenders. The model demonstrates that under plausible conditions,
private equity firms are incentivized to behave well toward lenders
(that is, to limit moral hazard in the borrowing company) in every
round of the game because lenders will reward such behavior with
lower interest rates.
Section 1. End Game Between Borrower and Lender
Take a company with initial assets A, where A is the owner’s
equity stake in the company or net worth. The company wishes to
make an investment I. The company can invest in either a “good”
project G or a “bad” project B. There are only two possible outcomes
for each project, “success” or “failure.” The bad project B has a
321

Of the two debt agency costs, moral hazard and adverse selection, this
model covers only the former for simplicity.
322
See TIROLE, supra note 124, at 114.
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higher return in the event of success (RB > RG), but a lower (zero)
return in the event of failure (FG > FB=0). The probability of success
for the bad and good projects are pB and pG, respectively, where pG >
pB. While each project has a positive net value (i.e., I is less than the
expected return on the project), project B is worse than project G
from the point of view of a risk-neutral investor, in the sense that the
expected return on B is less than the expected return on G. That is:
1
In order to make the investment, the company borrows (I –
A) at an interest rate r. For simplicity, we ignore time by assuming
that investment and repayment happen almost simultaneously, such
that r reflects only the risk premium.
The company will prefer to invest in project G so long as the
expected profit to the company from G exceeds the expected profit to
the company from B:
1
1

1

,0

1
1
; that is, the good project is
We assume
not a sure thing from the lenders’ perspective. Thus, the company
chooses the good project so long as:
1

1
(1)

Thus, companies having assets/equity exceeding this
threshold will invest in the good project G, while companies with
insufficient equity will invest in the bad project B—they will
succumb to moral hazard. Stated differently, the agency costs of debt
increase with the company’s leverage.
In this market, lenders will therefore lend at two different
rates of interest: one for companies with enough equity (enough
“skin in the game”)—that is, those satisfying equation (1)—and one
for companies with low equity/high leverage. This is because the risk
premium for lenders is different for the high-equity (low-leverage)
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borrowers, who will invest in the good project G, and the low-equity
(high-leverage) borrowers, who will invest in the bad project B. If
the lenders are perfectly competitive and risk-neutral (for simplicity),
and r is a competitive rate of interest at which the lenders break
even, then the interest rate for high-equity/low-leverage borrowers rG
will be such that the expected payout to the lenders from project G is
exactly equal to the amount loaned to finance G. Thus, rG is defined
by:323
1

1
1

(2)

The breakeven rate rB for low-equity/high-leverage borrowers is
likewise defined by:
1
(3)
It follows from equations (2) and (3) that rB > rG. Thus, the
interest rate charged by lenders will be higher for companies
investing with fewer assets/lower equity.
The implications of this general model for private equity are
straightforward. Private equity-owned companies tend to be highly
leveraged, so in an end game with lenders, such a company would
succumb to moral hazard and invest in worse projects. Knowing this
ex ante, lenders will charge it a higher interest rate.
Section 2. Repeated Game Between Borrower and
Lender
In this Section, the lenders are repeatedly lending to a
portfolio company of a given private equity firm. The company has a
small equity stake A, so according to the result derived in Section 1 it
should be facing the higher rate of interest rB. But the private equity
323

Per the assumption made above that
1
. If the project
fails, the company can only repay the return on the project in the event of
failure, FG, and not the full amount actually owed, 1
.
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firm implicitly commits to invest in the good project through its
reputation and thus obtains the lower interest rate rG in the first round
of the game. The lenders can always observe after the fact whether
the private equity firm has chosen the good or the bad project, given
that the outcomes are different under the two, but it cannot control
the firm’s choice.324 The lenders will lend to the portfolio company
at interest rate rG because of the private equity firm’s good
reputation; but if it breaks its reputation in any period by investing in
the bad project, it will face interest rate rB in all periods thereafter.
The private equity firm’s decision tree is the following:

We can now demonstrate that for plausible discount rates,
the private equity firm has an incentive to invest always in the good
project. It is sufficient to check whether the private equity firm gets a
greater return from:
(1) maintaining its reputation forever, thus earning the
“cooperative” payoff
each
1
period; or
(2) breaking its reputation today (“cheating”), thus earning a
higher payoff
for one
1
in
1
period, but a lower payoff
all periods thereafter.
The higher payoff from cheating is due to the greater attractiveness
of the bad project and the low interest rate rG with which the private
equity firm starts off.
324

A more complex model would allow for the possibility of unobservable
actions. In that case lenders could not observe directly whether the private
equity firm had chosen a good or bad investment opportunity, but when the
portfolio company has a bad outcome and cannot repay its loan, the lender
looks at the history of past performance and infers the likelihood that the
private equity firm chose a bad project. In short, the private equity firm’s
loan terms would in that case depend on the past history of successes and
failures. And again, under plausible conditions, this would motivate private
equity firms to invest in good projects.

188

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 33

The payoffs in future periods must be discounted for time
and the likelihood of a continuing lending relationship. Define
, where μ is the time-value of money, p is the probability in
any given period that the game will be played again in the next
period, and both μ and p are between 0 and 1.
As depicted in the decision tree above, the private equity
firm has two options:
Option 1: The private equity firm always invests in the good
project G in every period, such that its total expected profit will be:
1

1
1

⋯
1

1

⋯

1

1

Option 2: The private equity firm invests in the bad project
today (and is therefore punished with the higher interest rate in all
subsequent periods), such that its expected profit is:
1

1
1

⋯

1
1

1

Option 2 illustrates that there is a short-term gain from
cheating, but a long-term pain: the firm earns less in the periods after
it breaks its reputation.325
325

,
This can be shown by demonstrating that
1
the payoff in a period of good reputation, is greater than
1
, the payoff in a period of bad reputation. With some calculation,
and substituting in the equilibrium values of the interest rates from
equations (2) and (3), the proposition is true by definition of the good and
bad projects.
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The private equity firm will maintain its good reputation in
all periods if its profit from always investing in G (Option 1) exceeds
its profit from cheating by investing in B in the first period (Option
2), that is if:
1

1
1
1

1

which, after some calculation and substituting in the equilibrium
values of the interest rates from equations (2) and (3), is equivalent
to:
1
1
1
The numerator of the fraction in the final inequality is
positive because the returns to the good project G are better by
assumption. And the denominator is positive because 0
1. Thus, there are always values of close to 1 for which
private equity firms will choose to cooperate with lenders. By
definition of , a value of that is close to 1 requires: (a) a high
probability p that the game will be repeated in subsequent periods—a
reasonable assumption for private equity firms—and (b) a low time
value of money r, such that patience will actually be rewarded.326
Thus, the fact that private equity firms are in a repeated
game with lenders entails that they will cooperate with lenders by
mitigating agency costs. In turn, their portfolio companies will be
rewarded with better loan terms than comparably leveraged
companies can achieve.

326

Conversely, if the time value of money is too high, or the probability that
the game will be repeated is too low, the benefit from cheating in the first
period will outweigh the long-term pain from being punished by creditors in
future periods, and the private equity firm will invest in bad projects.

